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MAPPING CITIZENSHIP:  
STATUS, MEMBERSHIP, AND THE PATH IN BETWEEN 
 
D. Carolina Núñez* 
 
Abstract 
 
The concept of citizenship poses an interesting asymmetry: though all 
citizens receive the same rights and obligations on equal terms, citizenship 
is not distributed to individuals on equal terms. In the United States, some 
are citizens by virtue of birth within the national territory or birth to citizen 
parents. Others must undergo the process of naturalization. Different 
citizenship rules appear to solve for different variables, and it is not clear 
whether and how those variables relate to one another. 
This Article begins unraveling the paradox. It argues that the 
apparent paradox results from a failure to understand the relationship 
between citizenship’s formal and substantive dimensions. The Article 
reconceptualizes citizenship by decoupling substantive and formal 
citizenship. Formal citizenship is not a static condition that is or even 
ought to be synonymous with more abstract notions of membership and 
belonging. Rather, formal citizenship is a path that leads toward 
substantive citizenship, and formal citizenship rules serve as entrances to 
that path. Mapping and understanding the way that formal citizenship can 
relate to substantive citizenship can inform contemporary debates about 
citizenship, immigration, and membership. 
This Article offers a typology of the ways in which formal citizenship 
can relate to substantive citizenship. Citizenship rules can play a 
“descriptive” role by conferring citizenship on individuals who have 
already achieved some measure of substantive citizenship. But citizenship 
can also encourage an individual’s development of the qualities that make 
someone a desirable member of the polity. That is, citizenship rules may 
be “prescriptive” in that they distribute citizenship to individuals who are 
not yet fully substantive citizens. Citizenship rules may also be 
“predictive” in nature: they bestow citizenship on individuals who are 
likely to become substantive citizens and help facilitate that development. 
Other citizenship rules operate to claim individuals without regard to 
notions of membership and belonging; these may be fairly described as 
“conscriptive” citizenship rules. To illustrate the value of the proposed 
framework, this Article uses it to recast two contemporary debates that 
touch on citizenship: challenges to territorial birthright citizenship and 
the creation of a “path to citizenship” for DREAMers. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of citizenship poses an interesting asymmetry: though all citizens 
receive the same rights and obligations on equal terms, citizenship is not distributed 
to individuals on equal terms. In the United States, some are citizens by virtue of 
circumstance—birth within the national territory1 or birth to citizen parents.2 Others 
must prove their fitness for citizenship through the process of naturalization.3 All 
citizens, however, receive the same rights on the same terms,4 regardless of their 
path to citizenship.5 As I will explain in this Article, the existence of these varying 
rules, though at first puzzling, is a useful feature of U.S. citizenship law. This feature 
operates to better integrate immigrant communities, helps marginalized individuals 
gain the tools to develop a shared sense of identity with fellow citizens, and avoids 
the dangers of a tiered society where subsets of residents remain ineligible for 
                                                      
* © 2016 D. Carolina Núñez. Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, 
Brigham Young University. Thanks to Kif Augustine-Adams, Derek Bambauer, Ian 
Bartrum, Susan Bieber Coutin, Aliza Cover, Rose Cuison-Villazor, Carissa Hessick, Sarah 
Haan, Alan Hyde, Eric Jensen, Margaret Kwoka, David Martin, David Moore, Hiroshi 
Motomura, Michael Olivas, Shaakirrah Sanders, Gordon Smith, Paul Stancil, Michalyn 
Steele, and Leti Volpp for invaluable feedback on earlier drafts of this Article. I am also 
grateful for the helpful comments provided by the University of Notre Dame Law School 
faculty during a workshop of an earlier draft. Travis Hunt, Nathan Sumbot, Kimi Orr, Felicity 
Murphy, John Gibbons, and Nicholas Beatty provided excellent research and editing 
assistance. 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
2 See Immigration & Nationality Act §§ 301, 309, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409 (2012) 
[hereinafter I.N.A.].  
3 See I.N.A. § 316, 8 U.S.C. § 1427. 
4 Of course, I do not mean to say that all citizens actually experience equal citizenship, 
but rather that the law—in the abstract—treats all citizens equally. Several scholars of critical 
race theory, feminist legal theory, and other fields have discussed the lived realities and 
second-class citizenship of many different types of citizens. Kevin Johnson, for example, has 
traced the lived second-class status of people of color in a world of facially neutral laws. See, 
e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and 
California’s Proposition 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 
WASH. L. REV. 629, 629 (1995) [hereinafter Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics] 
(analyzing California’s Proposition 187 and its impact on immigration politics); Kevin R. 
Johnson, “Melting Pot” or “Ring of Fire”?: Assimilation and the Mexican-American 
Experience, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1259 (1997) [hereinafter Johnson, “Melting Pot” or 
“Ring of Fire”?] (discussing the assimilation difficulties of Mexican Americans). Katherine 
Bartlett has highlighted how females can experience actual gender discrimination caused by 
facially neutral laws. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender Law, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 
1, 6 (1994). Alexander Aleinikoff has also proposed that even ensuring that laws are 
“colorblind” is not enough to remedy the second-class experience of minority citizens. 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1062 
(1991). 
5 For a brief discussion of two exceptions to the principle of equal citizenship, see the 
text accompanying infra notes 69–70. 
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citizenship until they have proven to the satisfaction of the majority their worthiness 
for citizenship. 
But to fully explore how the coexistence of separate citizenship rules that 
impose different requirements on individuals can advance integration and shared 
identity, I first acknowledge the puzzle that varying citizenship rules creates. After 
all, in light of well-accepted notions of distributive justice, rights would be afforded 
based on indicators related to the right being distributed.6 In an ideal world, we 
would expect citizenship rules to identify individuals who are desirable members of 
the polity—however that might be defined—in a substantive way.7 But it is not clear 
how the various paths to U.S. citizenship qualify an individual for the same package 
of rights and benefits.8 A two-day-old infant born in Ohio to French immigrants and 
a forty-five-year-old school teacher from Vietnam who completes the naturalization 
process are both citizens of the United States under the law. A five-year-old child 
born and living in Argentina a year after her parents—both of them U.S. citizens—
moved there to work is also a citizen. Though the naturalized schoolteacher was 
required to demonstrate basic English proficiency and knowledge of U.S. history 
and civics,9 the Ohio-born infant cannot speak at all, and the Argentina-born child 
may speak Spanish rather than English. Neither knows anything of history and 
civics. In fact, there is no guarantee that the children will ever be able to meet the 
same requirements that the Vietnamese schoolteacher met in order to be 
naturalized.10 Yet all three individuals, each of whom qualified for citizenship under 
very different rules, are entitled to the same citizenship—and its corresponding 
rights—at the moment of birth or naturalization. It is not clear that any of the 
individuals would qualify for citizenship under any rule of citizenship except the 
one under which he or she acquired citizenship. Once again, this is not to say that 
                                                      
6 See infra Part II. 
7 Several scholars have made arguments, both generally and with respect to particular 
citizenship rules, based on just such an assumption. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Justifying 
U.S. Naturalization Policies, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 237, 237–38 (1994); Ayelet Shachar, The 
Worth of Citizenship in an Unequal World, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 367, 373 (2007) 
(criticizing birthright citizenship rules for failing to limit the distribution of citizenship to 
individuals who identify with the state’s political ideals of freedom and liberty or some other 
substantive characteristic); see also MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF 
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 50 (1983) (asserting that membership in a community, including 
citizenship, depends on a “sense of relatedness and mutuality”); Mark Tushnet, Creedal 
Citizenship, 9 ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1, 1 (2011) (suggesting that citizenship ought to 
relate to adherence to substantive values: “By creedal citizenship I mean something fairly 
modest, though important: a set of beliefs, not necessarily religious in content, but in which 
the adherent has some significant degree of emotional as well as cognitive investment.”). 
8 See Neuman, supra note 7, at 247–48 (“In a coherent system of citizenship law, one 
might expect continuities between the approaches to citizenship expressed in these other 
parts of citizenship law and the approaches expressed in naturalization policy. On the other 
hand, it might be too much to expect U.S. citizenship law to display coherence.”). 
9 See I.N.A. § 312, 8 U.S.C. § 1423. 
10 See PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: 
ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY 117 (1985).  
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any one of these hypothetical individuals is a less legitimate citizen than the others. 
In fact, this Article concludes otherwise. Rather, these hypotheticals merely 
highlight what appears to be a puzzling distribution of citizenship that calls into 
question the very rationale for the concept of citizenship.11 Why do citizenship rules 
appear to solve for different variables if citizenship provides the same rights and 
benefits to all citizens? Unraveling this paradox helps highlight how each rule works 
in conjunction with the others in a way that maximizes the potential for individuals’ 
development of meaningful membership in the United States. 
Though scholars have not explicitly discussed the paradoxical distribution of 
equal citizenship on unequal terms,12 I argue it lies at the heart of many 
contemporary inquiries into citizenship law. Commentators, however, have 
analyzed citizenship through very focused lenses that allow detailed discussion of 
some aspects of citizenship law,13 but provide little context or even recognition of 
the underlying paradox. For example, some scholars have explored the citizenship 
of children:14 Do children exercise a different kind of citizenship than do adults?15 
Why do children have citizenship at all? While such scholarship centers on 
children’s citizenship, it implicitly raises more general questions about whether 
citizenship rules adequately distribute citizenship to individuals who are fit for the 
                                                      
11 Stephen H. Legomsky, Why Citizenship?, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 279, 285 (1994) (arguing 
that all commentary on citizenship builds on this “fundamental question: What is 
accomplished by having a citizenship concept at all? Why, in other words, should the law 
affirmatively classify all earthlings as citizens or noncitizens and create rights, duties, and 
disabilities that hinge on that distinction?”). 
12 A few, however, have at least recognized the existence of this question. See, e.g., 
Neuman, supra note 7, at 247–48. 
13 Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt describe the tendency of scholars to focus on 
particular facets of citizenship as “balkanization.” Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, 
Citizenship Talk: Bridging the Gap Between Immigration and Race Perspectives, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2493, 2494 (2007). 
14 See Jacqueline Bhabha, The Citizenship Deficit: On Being a Citizen Child, 46 DEV. 
53, 53 (2003); Ruth Lister, Why Citizenship: Where, When and How Children, 
8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES LAW 693, 693 (2007); Jeremy Roche, Children: Rights, 
Participation and Citizenship, 6 CHILDHOOD 475, 475 (1999).  
15 See, e.g., DAVID CUTLER & ROGER FROST, TAKING THE INITIATIVE: PROMOTING 
YOUNG PEOPLE’S INVOLVEMENT IN PUBLIC DECISION MAKING IN THE UK 8 (2001) 
(discussing the concept of children as “citizens in waiting”); Madeleine Arnot & Jo-Anne 
Dillabough, Introduction, in CHALLENGING DEMOCRACY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
ON GENDER, EDUCATION AND CITIZENSHIP 1, 12 (Madeleine Arnot & Jo-Anne Dillabough 
eds., 2000) (describing children as “learner citizens”); Ruth Lister et al., Young People and 
Citizenship, in YOUTH POLICY AND SOCIAL INCLUSION: CRITICAL DEBATES WITH YOUNG 
PEOPLE 33, 33 (Monica Barry ed., 2005) (proposing that children are “citizens in the 
making”); Michael Wyness et al., Childhood, Politics and Ambiguity: Towards an Agenda 
for Children’s Political Inclusion, 38 SOC. 81, 82 (2004) (suggesting that children are 
“apprentice citizens”). But see Elizabeth F. Cohen, Neither Seen nor Heard: Children’s 
Citizenship in Contemporary Democracies, 9 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 221, 236 (2005) (“Liberal 
democracies owe children a more carefully defined and judiciously governed political status 
that acknowledges their needs alongside their weaknesses and vulnerabilities.”). 
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exercise of citizenship. More broadly, it highlights the reality that not all citizens are 
identically qualified or prepared to exercise citizenship rights and obligations despite 
being citizens.  
Likewise, many critiques of birthright citizenship arise from the paradox of 
equal citizenship distributed on unequal terms. Why does the U.S. border dictate 
citizenship at birth? How are individuals born inside the border more deserving than 
those born outside?16 What about individuals who are born inside the United States 
as a result of a parent’s unauthorized crossing of the border?17 At bottom, these 
questions challenge territorial birthright citizenship’s ability to identify individuals 
who are fit for the same citizenship that other citizens have. 
Commentators have also focused on particular aspects of citizenship, including 
citizenship as rights,18 citizenship as participation,19 citizenship as work,20 
citizenship as standing,21 and citizenship as identity.22 But few have discussed the 
relationships among these different facets, perhaps because these concepts do not 
always coincide. After all, an individual may experience citizenship as rights, but 
fail to experience citizenship as participation. Why are rights distributed to 
individuals who do not or cannot participate? Why not distribute rights to those who 
do participate? These questions cannot be answered with reference to a single facet 
of citizenship. 
My purpose here is to widen the lens. My interest is not in the effect of a single 
citizenship rule, in a single facet of citizenship, or in a particular group’s lack of 
access to citizenship or citizenship rights, though my analysis sheds light on those 
issues. Rather, my interest lies in the very existence of multiple, disparate rules that 
purport to grant the very same citizenship and what it says about citizenship 
generally and in the United States. Here, I take a high-altitude view of the citizenship 
landscape to create a conceptual map. Rather than focus on a single rule or aspect of 
                                                      
16 See, e.g., AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL 
INEQUALITY 4–5 (2009) (challenging the view that citizenship should be based on the 
location of one’s birth).  
17 See, e.g., SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 118 (suggesting that U.S. citizenship 
is not guaranteed to children of “illegal aliens and ‘nonimmigrant’ aliens”).  
18 See, e.g., T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS AND OTHER ESSAYS 47, 
85 (1950) (discussing the “rapidly developing concept of the rights of citizenship on the 
structure of social inequality”). 
19 See, e.g., Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent 
Work on Citizenship Theory, 104 ETHICS 352, 353 (1994) (describing one meaning of 
citizenship as “‘citizenship-as-desirable-activity,’ where the extent and quality of one’s 
citizenship is a function of one’s participation in that community”).  
20 See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt, Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 1161, 1191 (2008) (arguing that “work functions as an important pathway to 
citizenship as a form of belonging”). 
21 See, e.g., JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 2 
(1991) (“[C]itizenship in America has never been just a matter of agency and empowerment, 
but also of social standing as well.”). 
22 See, e.g., Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 19, at 353 (calling for “‘a theory of 
citizenship’ that focuses on the identity . . . of individual citizens”).  
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citizenship—a single peak or valley in the landscape—I explore the relationship 
between citizenship rules and the substance of citizenship itself—the broader 
geography of the landscape. This is not to say that individual rules and aspects of 
citizenship are not worthwhile units of analysis. They are. But a more holistic 
understanding of citizenship can give greater context and nuance to the details of 
citizenship.23 Here, I examine the coexistence of seemingly dissonant citizenship 
rules to help illuminate the nature of citizenship and its relationship to notions of 
membership and belonging. 
In this Article, I advance existing commentary on citizenship in two ways. First, 
I reconceptualize citizenship by disentangling “formal citizenship,” the government-
issued legal status, from more abstract notions of membership and belonging, which 
I call “substantive citizenship.” I argue that, though formal citizenship and 
substantive citizenship are inextricably tied, they are not synonymous and need not 
be.24 Second, I offer a typology that explains how formal citizenship and substantive 
citizenship relate to each other. This, in turn, allows formal citizenship to emerge as 
a dynamic trajectory (rather than a static condition) that can promote, facilitate, and 
preserve an individual’s development of substantive citizenship. In that sense, 
formal citizenship can be a culmination of an individual’s development of 
substantive citizenship or a catalyst of that development. 
To achieve these purposes, my Article proceeds in four parts. In Part II, below, 
I begin by discussing the concept of membership and argue that legal rights and 
benefits can be thought of as the privileges of certain types of membership. This 
preliminary discussion of membership contextualizes Part III’s description of 
citizenship, generally, and U.S. citizenship law. There, I argue that citizenship in the 
United States appears, at first glance, to be distributed in a paradoxical fashion and 
against well-accepted norms of distributive justice. 
In Part IV, I argue that the apparent paradox of equal citizenship distributed on 
unequal terms stems from an inadequate understanding of citizenship. I argue that 
formal citizenship—the legal status—must be understood as separate and distinct 
from substantive citizenship—a more abstract sense of membership and belonging. 
Further, I introduce a typology that categorizes the various ways that formal 
citizenship can relate to substantive citizenship. In particular, I highlight the 
transformative power of formal citizenship. By conferring citizenship to an 
individual, the state provides rights, privileges, and benefits that, in turn, help the 
individual develop substantive citizenship. 
                                                      
23 Jennifer Gordon and R.A. Lenhardt have described the balkanization of citizenship 
scholarship: “Because ‘citizenship’ is used to mean so many things, explorations of 
citizenship in different fields may run on parallel tracks, never intersecting, even though each 
set of analyses might benefit greatly from interaction with others.” Gordon & Lenhardt, 
supra note 13, at 2494. In this Article, I help overcome this “balkanization,” not by directly 
connecting any particular tracks of scholarship, but by constructing a large-scale framework 
that accommodates and undergirds many tracks. 
24 Using terms from citizenship theory, I might recharacterize this: the thin conception 
of citizenship—the formal legal label—is not synonymous with a thick conception of 
citizenship as a more substantive view of citizenship as activity or identity.  
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Part V illustrates the value of this typology by translating several important 
contemporary debates about citizenship into the framework proposed in this Article. 
While the typology advanced in this Article has application outside of the United 
States—in fact, I use examples from outside the United States to help illustrate the 
typology—I limit myself to U.S.-specific examples in this Part. First, I highlight 
how an understanding of the various ways in which formal citizenship relates to 
substantive citizenship can inform and give substance to current and historical 
debates about the distribution of citizenship, including those surrounding the 
DREAM Act and proposals to withhold citizenship from the U.S.-born children of 
undocumented immigrants. In Part VI, I offer some brief conclusions and questions 
for the future. 
 
II.  MEMBERSHIP 
 
Basic notions of membership are a rich and driving force of individual and 
group identity, the distribution of rights, and the imposition of burdens and 
responsibilities.25 By membership, I mean the abstract—but intuitive—notion of 
belonging.26 On the most basic level, we are members of families, communities, 
cultures, and churches. More mundane examples include membership in fitness 
clubs, farming co-ops, and book clubs. In all these cases, membership suggests a 
sense of belonging that often shapes individuals’ identity.  
In addition, membership secures privileges that are unavailable to nonmembers. 
That is what ultimately makes membership desirable. Membership in a fitness club, 
for example, guarantees use of the club’s health and fitness equipment. Farming co-
op members may have access to fresh produce each week, and book club members 
enjoy camaraderie and stimulating discussion of books. But these benefits are not 
free; membership also entails obligation. Whether it is by paying dues, working on 
the co-op farm, or hosting book-club gatherings, members undertake some 
obligation.  
In all of the examples mentioned above, the membership entity must make 
decisions about who may be a member and who remains a nonmember. A fitness 
club may limit membership to individuals who show a willingness and ability to pay 
for one year of membership. This helps the fitness club ensure that it can continue 
to offer membership benefits to all its members for the coming year. A farming co-
op may select individuals with farming experience or who own farming equipment. 
This helps the co-op maximize the possibility that it will produce fresh produce for 
all its members. A sports team may select individuals who demonstrate skill in the 
sport. This allows the team the best chance to engage in competitive matches—one 
of the very benefits of membership.  
                                                      
25 PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION 
151 (2008) (“All communities set terms for membership.”). 
26 Elsewhere, I have written extensively about notions of membership and belonging. 
My discussion here tracks and echoes these prior writings. See, e.g., D. Carolina Núñez, 
Fractured Membership: Deconstructing Territoriality to Secure Rights and Remedies for the 
Undocumented Worker, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 817, 824 (2010). 
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These examples highlight an intuitive idea: membership entities logically select 
members based on the substance of the “club” at issue. This might take one of many 
forms: a membership entity might make membership decisions based on individuals’ 
ability to bear the responsibilities of membership, a common interest with other 
members, or a common goal. It would seem absurd and unjust for the fitness club to 
offer membership based on musical ability, the farming co-op to select members 
based on applicants’ fashion preferences, or for the book club to base its decisions 
on shoe size. 
The concept of membership extends beyond the types of examples mentioned 
above. Indeed, legal rights can be thought of as benefits of membership. Whenever 
a state distributes a good—or, in legal parlance, a right—the state sorts members 
from nonmembers. When a state issues a driver’s license, for example, it essentially 
admits that person as a “member” of an abstract driving “club.” We would expect 
the state to select its drivers based on criteria that relate to the responsibilities the 
driver will undertake and the benefits that the driver will enjoy. It comes as no 
surprise, then, that a state limits membership in this “club” to individuals who can 
properly see roadside signs and understand and obey traffic laws. Such an individual 
is likely to help keep the roads safe, a benefit that all license holders enjoy. We 
would instinctively reject a rule that issued driver’s licenses to individuals based on 
wealth, cooking abilities, or hobbies. 
These principles of membership coincide with Michael Walzer’s theory of 
distributive justice—that every social good should be distributed to individuals 
based on criteria that relate to the very social good being distributed.27 In this state 
of complex equality, the distribution of a good is “just or unjust relative to the social 
meanings of the goods at stake.”28 A distribution of a good based on criteria that are 
relevant to a different social good would constitute an unjust distribution. “Every 
social good or set of goods constitutes, as it were, a distributive sphere within which 
only certain criteria and arrangements are appropriate.”29 Each good is distributed in 
its own “sphere of justice.”30 
 
III.  CITIZENSHIP AND MEMBERSHIP 
 
The state’s distribution of citizenship is a paradigmatic exercise in sorting 
members from nonmembers. Members acquire access to a suite of rights and 
privileges31 that are exclusively reserved for citizens—the benefits of membership 
                                                      
27 See WALZER, supra note 7, at 20 (“No social good x should be distributed to men 
and women who possess some other good y merely because they possess y and without 
regard to the meaning of x.”); see also BERNARD WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF THE SELF: 
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1956–1972, at 248 (1973) (“[O]ne might hope for a society in which 
there existed both a fair, rational, and appropriate distribution of these goods . . . .”).  
28 WALZER, supra note 7, at 9. 
29 Id. at 10. 
30 Id. 
31 In this Article, I often refer to citizenship rights, privileges, and benefits. I use these 
to refer generically to the state-guaranteed advantages of citizenship. Others have undertaken 
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in the “club.” In a Walzerian world, citizenship would be distributed to individuals 
who somehow demonstrate qualities or characteristics that relate to the substance of 
citizenship. This might take the form of distributing citizenship to individuals who 
demonstrate the ability to take on the obligations and responsibilities of citizenship. 
Or citizenship might be distributed to individuals who share a common quality or 
characteristic. Ultimately, the criteria would depend on the substantive meaning of 
citizenship in that state. 
Even without defining the substantive meaning of citizenship in the United 
States, its rules are puzzling. The coexistence of separate rules providing citizenship 
based on entirely different criteria seems to pose a problem for the principles of 
membership advocated here and elsewhere. What is it about birth within the U.S. 
territory (jus soli), birth to U.S. citizen parents (jus sanguinis), or the fulfillment of 
a list of language, morality, civics, and other requirements (naturalization) that 
qualify individuals for the very same citizenship? The three approaches to 
citizenship appear to produce results that are at odds with each other. Each rule may 
produce citizens that could not have qualified and would never qualify under either 
of the remaining rules. Yet the law behaves as though citizens are identically 
qualified in that it offers each individual an identical package of rights and 
obligations. 
In this Part, I explore this puzzle in detail. Here, I discuss the concept of 
citizenship, both abstractly and with reference to U.S. law, to more fully explore the 
dissonance in U.S. citizenship law and offer some preliminary possibilities that 
explain this dissonance. This sets the stage for Part IV, which offers a 
reconceptualization of citizenship that helps explain and even legitimize that 
dissonance.  
 
A.  Citizenship in Multiple Dimensions 
 
Perhaps because of its close association with abstract notions of belonging, the 
term “citizenship” can refer to many different concepts.32 Commentators have, for 
instance, discussed citizenship as social standing,33 citizenship as participation,34 
                                                      
a more nuanced categorization of types of citizenship rights, but such distinctions are not 
necessary in the analysis here. See Thomas Janoski & Brian Gran, Political Citizenship: 
Foundations of Rights, in HANDBOOK OF CITIZENSHIP STUDIES 13, 16 (Engin F. Isin & Bryan 
S. Turner eds., 2002) (describing Hohfeld’s theory of rights to distinguish between 
citizenship liberties, claims, powers, and immunities). 
32 Gordon & Lenhardt, supra note 13, at 2494 (“Because citizenship has so many 
dimensions, it is important to be precise about which dimensions are under discussion at any 
given moment.”). 
33 SHKLAR, supra note 21, at 2. 
34 Id. at 3. 
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citizenship as rights,35 citizenship as identity,36 and citizenship as status,37 among 
other things. These various dimensions of citizenship might be grouped into two 
broad categories: formal and substantive citizenship.38 
 
1.  Formal Citizenship 
 
By formal citizenship, I refer to the dimensions of citizenship controlled by the 
state and administered through the law. The state exerts exclusive control over only 
two dimensions of citizenship. First, the state has exclusive control over the 
distribution of the formal, legal status of nationality.39 This is not to say that the state 
completely ignores the contributions that citizens can or will make, citizens’ sense 
of identity, the social standing that citizenship brings, or any other facets of 
citizenship. In fact, as I will argue in Part IV, citizenship rules can help promote and 
incentivize other dimensions of citizenship. But the state cannot distribute any type 
of citizenship other than legal nationality, and individuals cannot exert power over 
the distribution of legal nationality. Second, the state has exclusive control over the 
legal rights that its citizens enjoy.40 Again, this power may allow the state to 
influence other dimensions of citizenship, but the state does not have the power to 
unilaterally determine or create those other dimensions of citizenship. Rather, they 
are subject to a variety of forces ranging from individual choice to happenstance. 
These state-centric dimensions of citizenship—the bestowal of citizenship in 
conjunction with the state’s attachment of rights to that citizenship—make up formal 
citizenship.41 As discussed below, there is broad consensus on the normative 
qualities of the formal legal concept of citizenship. On the most basic level, formal 
citizenship should do at least two things: (a) guarantee a set of rights to its holders 
and (b) provide those rights equally to all citizens.  
  
                                                      
35 See Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 
452–53, 455–56 (2000) (distinguishing between citizenship as rights, legal status, political 
activity, and identity/solidarity). 
36 See id. 
37 Id. 
38 The distinction between formal citizenship and substantive citizenship overlaps but 
does not coincide with several other categorizations of citizenship. ENGIN F. ISIN & PATRICIA 
K. WOOD, CITIZENSHIP & IDENTITY 4–5 (1999) (dividing citizenship into “a set of practices 
(cultural, symbolic and economic) and a bundle of rights and duties (civil, political, and 
social)”). 
39 SHKLAR, supra note 21, at 3–4. 
40 Janoski & Gran, supra note 31, at 13 (“[C]itizenship rights are legislated by 
governmental decision-making bodies, promulgated by executive orders, or enacted and later 
enforced by legal decisions.”). 
41 Rogers M. Smith, Modern Citizenship, in HANDBOOK OF CITIZENSHIP STUDIES, supra 
note 31, at 105, 105 (describing the modern conception of citizenship as bestowing 
nationality on individuals and guaranteeing basic rights). 
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(a)  Rights 
 
Formal citizenship’s most recognizable feature and most widely recognized 
dimension is its guarantee of legal rights.42 Citizenship rights are featured in 
numerous commentaries on citizenship. T.H. Marshall, whose seminal work on 
citizenship became the starting point for subsequent citizenship scholarship, 
famously categorized citizenship rights into civil, social, and political.43 While 
typologies vary, the normative model remains the same: citizenship has substance 
only if it secures rights.  
In the United States, citizenship guarantees individuals the full suite of rights 
and benefits provided by the state. While many of these rights are also available to 
certain noncitizens, some are reserved exclusively for citizens.44 Citizens, for 
instance, enjoy the exclusive right to vote,45 the right to remain within the national 
territory indefinitely, the ability to enter and leave the United States on a preferred 
basis,46 protection when the citizen is abroad,47 access to welfare benefits on a 
preferred basis,48 the ability to petition the government for the admission of 
                                                      
42 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 
CONST. COMMENT. 9, 12–13 (1990) (“[M]ost Americans would probably recognize the 
possession of political rights as the most significant difference between aliens and citizens.”); 
Janoski & Gran, supra note 31, at 13. (“Citizenship is grounded in the guarantee of legal and 
political protections from raw coercive power . . . .”). 
43 Marshall defined civil citizenship as “the rights necessary for individual freedom—
liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to 
conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice.” MARSHALL, supra note 18, at 10. He 
defined political citizenship and the right to participate in the political processes and social 
citizenship as “the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security 
to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civili[z]ed being 
according to the standards prevailing in the society.” Id. at 11. Some of these are not 
necessarily accurately described as the rights of formal citizenship in the U.S. because those 
rights are not exclusive to citizens in the U.S.  
44 For an argument that U.S. citizenship rights are only minimal, see SPIRO, supra note 
25, at 81 (“[C]itizenship makes very little difference. What the state extracts from you and 
what it owes you are minimally contingent on citizenship status. Citizens are privileged in 
only a few dwindling contexts.”); see also Peter H. Schuck, Liberal Citizenship, in 
HANDBOOK OF CITIZENSHIP STUDIES, supra note 31, at 131, 139 (“[A]lmost all of the rights 
of US citizens are also enjoyed by legal resident aliens.”). 
45 For an account of the historical U.S. practice of allowing noncitizens to vote, see 
ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN 
THE UNITED STATES 33–40 (2000) (discussing history of noncitizen voting in United States). 
46 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Between Principles and Politics: U.S. Citizenship Policy, 
in FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS: MEMBERSHIP IN A CHANGING WORLD 119, 119 
(T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2000) (“Other benefits accompany 
citizenship, such as eligibility for a passport, the right to not be deported, and the ability to 
seek protection by their home government when traveling in a foreign country.”). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
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noncitizen relatives,49 and more. It is the guarantee of rights unavailable to others—
its very exclusivity—that helps make citizenship desirable and socially 
consequential.50 
Before moving on to the second universal feature of citizenship, it is worth 
noting that the state also has exclusive control over the imposition of citizenship 
responsibilities and obligations.51  Public rhetoric often talks of “the rights and 
obligations of citizenship.” This is the corollary to the state’s exclusive power to 
secure rights. However, modern citizenship systems impose relatively few burdens. 
Among those, some states subject citizens to compulsory voting requirements,52 
mandatory military service,53 and burdensome extraterritorial taxation,54 but U.S. 
citizenship carries relatively few legal obligations.55 Though there is a sociocultural 
expectation that good citizens will vote, voting is not required in the United States, 
and voter turnout is often disappointing.56 While jury duty, on the other hand, is 
                                                      
49 I.N.A. § 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012) (stating that while legal permanent residents 
have the right to petition for noncitizen spouses and unmarried children, citizens may also 
petition for their noncitizen parents, married children (and their spouses and children under 
twenty-one), and siblings (and their spouses and children under twenty-one)).  
50 Justice Byron White justified the exclusion of aliens from access to certain rights on 
this basis: “The exclusion of aliens from basic governmental processes is not a deficiency in 
the democratic system but a necessary consequence of the community’s process of political 
self-definition.” Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982). 
51 See generally CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN, LIBERAL RIGHTS AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES: ESSAYS ON CITIZENSHIP AND SOVEREIGNTY 1 (Oxford Press 2014). 
52 For an examination of Australia’s compulsory voting system, see M. Mackerras & I. 
McAllister, Compulsory Voting, Party Stability and Electoral Advantage in Australia, 18 
ELECTORAL STUD. 217, 223–24 (1999). For an analysis of Brazil’s compulsory voting 
requirement, see Timothy J. Power & J. Timmons Roberts, Compulsory Voting, Invalid 
Ballots, and Abstention in Brazil, 48 POL. RES. Q. 795, 797–98 (1995). 
53 Israel, Brazil, and Finland require compulsory military service. See The World 
Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2024.html [https://perma.cc/5EXA-JM9S] (last visited May 1, 2016); see 
also Kari Laitinen, National or International? Contending Discourses on Finnish 
Conscription, in THE CHANGING FACE OF EUROPEAN CONSCRIPTION 41, 41 (Pertti Joenniemi 
ed., 2006) (discussing how Finnish conscription contains stronger mythical elements 
compared with other Nordic countries); Hanne Eggen Røislien, Religion and Military 
Conscription: The Case of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), 39 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 
213, 216–18 (2012) (discussing how the Israel Defense Force operates as a conscript army 
and drafts its individual members).  
54 China has worldwide taxation requirements for citizens, which it plans to enforce 
more strictly in the future. See Keith Bradsher, China Wants Taxes Paid by Citizens Living 
Afar, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2015) (on file with the Utah Law Review), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/08/business/international/china-starts-enforcing-tax-law-
for-citizens-working-abroad.html.  
55 Schuck, supra note 44, at 131. 
56 See Editorial, The Worst Voter Turnout in 72 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2014) (on 
file with the Utah Law Review), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/opinion/the-worst-
voter-turnout-in-72-years.html.  
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mandatory, the law provides ample opportunities for avoiding it.57 The United States 
does require male citizens to register for selective service in the military, but this 
requirement is not tied exclusively to citizenship.58 Beyond male citizens, the 
requirement extends to all permanently residing males, including legal permanent 
residents and undocumented immigrants, who meet specified criteria.59 U.S. 
citizenship, then, is not particularly burdensome. This rights-heavy model is typical 
in modern states. 
 
(b)  Equality 
 
Beyond guaranteeing rights, however, citizenship should guarantee them on an 
equal basis.60 As Rogers Brubaker explained, citizens exercise their rights in a 
“region of legal equality”61 such that all citizens are entitled to the same rights and 
subject to the same obligations on the same terms.62 Regardless of race, social class, 
education, wealth, and beliefs, a citizen is a citizen and must be treated as such under 
the law.63 This holds generally true in the United States: formally, citizens have 
equal access to rights. More precisely, citizens are entitled to rights on the same 
terms. This principle is embedded in the U.S. Constitution and is a hallmark of the 
U.S. civic ideal. Among other things, citizens may vote, remain in the United States, 
                                                      
57 For a historical account of the details and failure of compulsory jury service in the 
United States, see Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal Trials in America, 1796–
1996, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2673, 2673–75 (1996). 
58 See SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., SELECTIVE SERVICE—WHO MUST REGISTER, 
https://www.sss.gov/portals/0/PDFs/WhoMustRegisterChart.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6KB-
RLMU] (last visited May 1, 2016). 
59 See id. 
60 Rogers Brubaker identified six membership norms of citizenship. William Rogers 
Brubaker, Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-State in France and Germany: A 
Comparative Historical Analysis, 5 INT’L SOC. 379, 380 (1990). Under his model, citizenship 
“should be egalitarian, sacred, national, democratic, unique and socially consequential.” Id.; 
see also MARSHALL, supra note 18, at 28–29 (“All who possess the status [of citizenship] 
are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed.”). 
61 ROGERS BRUBAKER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONHOOD IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 21 
(1992); Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 19, at 370 (“On the orthodox view, citizenship is, 
by definition, a matter of treating people as individuals with equal rights under the law. This 
is what distinguishes democratic citizenship from feudal and other premodern views that 
determined people’s political status by their religious, ethnic, or class membership.”); see 
also MARSHALL, supra note 18, at 8–10 (discussing the effects of class distinctions on 
citizenship and citizens’ participation in society). 
62 See Ediberto Román, The Citizenship Dialectic, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 557, 565, 568 
(2006) (“Equality among the citizenry is not only a deeply rooted component of citizenship 
literature but is also a basis for the citizenship ideal.” (citation omitted)). 
63 This principle is sometimes described not as equality of citizenship but as protection 
of minorities. That is, equality is preserved specifically by “protecting ‘the few’ who have 
little power . . . who need shelter from the tyranny of ‘the many’ and/or elites.” Janoski & 
Gran, supra note 31, at 13. 
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and access welfare benefits on the same terms without regard to race, culture, 
religion, or social class. 
This is not to say that all U.S. citizens have unencumbered access to all the 
same rights. Scholars have documented the myriad ways in which U.S. citizens who 
are members of minority groups experience, as a matter of practical reality, limited 
citizenship rights.64 The resulting second-class citizenship is very real and poses a 
significant problem to the liberal democratic ideal. But the creation of second-class 
citizenship cannot be explicitly embedded into the structure of the state’s 
distribution of citizenship rights under well-accepted normative models of 
citizenship. Indeed, in the United States, second-class citizenship is not a feature of 
citizenship, but largely a by-product of inappropriate and often illegal practices and 
cultural biases. For purposes of this Article, I am interested in the state’s express 
guarantees of rights rather than de facto experienced rights.  
In a few instances, U.S. law does make express distinctions among citizens that 
result in some citizens having fewer rights. Equal protection jurisprudence exists 
precisely to delineate between constitutional and unconstitutional ways in which the 
government may distinguish between individuals.65 The Supreme Court has found 
some distinctions between classes of citizens constitutional. For example, the Court 
has declined to strike down provisions that make convicted felons ineligible to vote 
in elections.66 This might appear to be inconsistent with the “region of legal equality” 
of the universally accepted normative model for citizenship. After all, one class of 
citizens—convicted felons—has restricted access to one of the rights attached to 
citizenship. Indeed, several scholars have criticized this aspect of current U.S. voting 
laws.67 But this restriction could also be characterized as a feature of an equal 
citizenship regime in that all citizens are subject to this prohibition on the same 
                                                      
64 See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 1113–15; Bartlett, supra note 4, at 1; Johnson, 
An Essay on Immigration Politics, supra note 4, at 629–30.  
65 For an interesting article exploring the meaning of “similarly situated” in Equal 
Protection jurisprudence, see Giovanna Shay, Similarly Situated, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
581, 581 (2011); see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 60 (1973) 
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“There is hardly a law on the books that does not affect some people 
differently from others.”); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961) (“The 
constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly 
irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective. State legislatures are presumed to have 
acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in 
some inequality.”). 
66 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (upholding felon 
disenfranchisement laws). 
67 See Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony Disenfranchisement and the 
Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 349, 405 (2012) (demonstrating the factors 
that inhibit convicted felons’ access to voting rights, including “[c]lass and race-based 
stigma, collateral consequences, onerous re-enfranchisement requirements, and burgeoning 
carceral debt”); Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal 
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1048–52 
(questioning the liberal and republican justifications for disenfranchisement of convicted 
felons). 
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terms.68 Importantly for this Article, these prohibitions do not apply differently to 
citizens depending on the method they acquired citizenship. 
In fact, I am aware of only a few rights or benefits of U.S. citizenship that are 
legally restricted based on the method of acquiring citizenship.69 Two important ones 
come to mind.70 First, the U.S. Constitution expressly limits eligibility for the 
presidency to “natural born citizens.”71 Commentators have not always agreed on 
                                                      
68 This is not to say that I support disenfranchisement of convicted citizens. In fact, I 
would argue that denials of citizenship rights to convicted citizens only serves to alienate 
and further exclude them in a way that impedes their development of the substantive 
citizenship described in this Article. That is, felon disenfranchisement laws arguably do not 
adequately account for the prescriptive role of formal citizenship described in Part IV. 
69 Arguably, naturalized and birthright citizens could be described as having unequal 
access to rights by virtue of the differing evidence requirements each will produce to prove 
citizenship status as a prerequisite to exercising citizenship rights. Individuals who are 
citizens by virtue of birth in U.S. territory may show a birth certificate to prove citizenship 
while others may need to produce a certificate of citizenship or a passport as proof of 
citizenship. See Fatma Marouf, The Hunt for Noncitizen Voters, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 
66, 66 (2012). Here I also note that there are several examples of states discriminating against 
certain U.S.-born citizens. Some states, for example, have denied or continue to deny in-state 
resident college tuition rates to U.S. citizens who are the children of undocumented 
immigrants. See Michael A. Olivas, Lawmakers Gone Wild? College Residency and the 
Response to Professor Kobach, 61 SMU L. REV. 99, 109 (2008) (documenting state efforts 
to deny in-state resident college tuition rates to the children of undocumented immigrants, 
including those born in the U.S.). Texas has prevented U.S.-born children access to their 
birth certificates by imposing burdensome identification requirements—ones that 
undocumented immigrants have difficulty meeting—for a parent wishing to obtain the 
certificate. See Manny Fernandez, Immigrants Fight Texas’ Birth Certificate Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 17, 2015) (on file with the Utah Law Review), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/us/illegal-immigrant-birth-certificates.html. At first, 
this might look like a distinction that is based on a method of acquiring citizenship. After all, 
states are discriminating against individuals who obtained citizenship by birth in the U.S. 
after their parents entered or remained in the United States without authorization. However, 
these distinctions do not distinguish among jus soli, jus sanguinis, and/or naturalization. 
They discriminate based on parents’ immigration status. These distinctions are reprehensible 
and face strong legal challenges, but they do not represent discrimination based on a method 
of acquiring citizenship. 
70 Other than the two mentioned in the text, I have encountered only one other 
circumstance in which the method of acquiring citizenship creates differing legal rights or 
benefits. The tax code normally requires a U.S. citizen residing abroad to pay certain taxes 
upon renouncing U.S. citizenship. However, an individual who was born both a U.S. citizen 
and the citizen of another country—a birthright dual citizen—may avoid this exit tax. The 
effect of this distinction is to require all naturalized U.S. citizens to pay the exit tax upon 
expatriation, but require only some birthright citizens to pay that exit tax. See 26 U.S.C. § 
877A (g)(1)(B)(i) (2015). 
71 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; see Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 165 (1964) (“We 
start from the premise that the rights of citizenship of the native born and of the naturalized 
person are of the same dignity and are coextensive. The only difference drawn by the 
Constitution is that only the ‘natural born’ citizen is eligible to be President.”); Knauer v. 
492 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
exactly who is included in this term, but there is broad consensus on who it 
excludes:72 naturalized citizens are not natural born citizens and therefore cannot be 
elected to the presidency.73 Second, naturalized citizens may lose citizenship on 
slightly different terms than their birthright citizen counterparts. The U.S. 
government may revoke a naturalized citizen’s citizenship that was obtained through 
fraud or some other illegal act.74 In essence, such denaturalization rules call into 
question the validity of naturalization and the legitimacy of the acquired citizenship. 
 
2.  Substantive Citizenship 
 
Citizenship means more than just the state’s guarantee of equal rights. The word 
“citizen” conjures notions of belonging, inclusion, and shared identity,75 and 
scholars have described a more substantive—or “thick”—conception of 
citizenship.76 In addition to its formal dimensions, citizenship has a “membership 
                                                      
United States, 328 U.S. 654, 658 (1946); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673 
(1944); Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913); Jill A. Pryor, The Natural-Born Citizen 
Clause and Presidential Eligibility: An Approach for Resolving Two Hundred Years of 
Uncertainty, 97 YALE L.J. 881, 881 (1988) (“Despite its apparent simplicity, the natural-born 
citizen clause of the Constitution has never been completely understood. . . . It is . . . clear 
that persons born abroad of alien parents, who later become citizens by naturalization, do not 
[qualify].” (citations omitted)); see also Sarah Helene Duggin & Mary Beth Collins, ‘Natural 
Born’ in the USA: The Striking Unfairness and Dangerous Ambiguity of the Constitution’s 
Presidential Qualifications Clause and Why We Need to Fix It, 85 B.U. L. REV. 53, 54–55 
(2005) (discussing the ambiguity of the “natural born Citizen” clause); Christina S. Lohman, 
Presidential Eligibility: The Meaning of the Natural-Born Citizen Clause, 36 GONZ. L. REV. 
349, 349 (2001) (analyzing the history and disagreements over the meaning of the “natural 
born Citizen” provision). 
72 See supra note 71 and accompanying text; see also Duggin & Collins, supra note 71, 
at 56 n.11 (indicating that “individuals born outside the United States who have no claim to 
United States citizenship other than post-birth naturalization . . . are barred from serving as 
President or Vice President.”); Lohman, supra note 71, at 360 (stating that under English 
common law “any child born to an alien enemy father engaged in hostile occupation of 
British territory was not a natural-born British subject . . . [and] any child born to an alien 
father who was an ambassador or diplomat of a foreign state was also excluded.” (citation 
omitted)).  
73 See Schneider, 377 U.S. at 165.  
74 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 340(a), (e), (j), 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (2012).  
75 D. Carolina Núñez, War of the Words: Aliens, Immigrants, Citizens, and the 
Language of Exclusion, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1517, 1518, 1523.  
76 See, e.g., Diemut Bubeck, Thin, Thick and Feminist Conception of Citizenship, 
CONTEMPORARY POL. STUD. 461, 461–62 (1995) (defining thick citizenship as active 
engagement in the community and political life); Charles Tilly, Citizenship, Identity and 
Social History, in CITIZENSHIP, IDENTITY AND SOCIAL HISTORY 1, 8 (1996) (“Citizenship can 
then range from thin to thick: thin where it entails few transactions, rights and obligations; 
thick where it occupies a significant share of all transactions, rights and obligations sustained 
by state agents and people living under their jurisdiction.”); Effie MacLachlan, The Graduate 
Sch. & Univ. Ctr. of the City of N.Y., Address at the ECSA Sixth Biennial International 
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facet”: “the sense of belonging and participation in the national community.”77 This 
could take a number of forms, depending on a community’s understanding of 
membership in the national community.78 It is in this “thick” conception of 
citizenship that a sense of shared identity, loyalty, responsibility, and contribution 
come into play.79 When we talk about citizens, we often contemplate this 
“substantive citizenship” in addition to the more formal citizenship described above.  
Substantive citizenship escapes precise description, both because it is an 
abstract concept and because it is country specific. States may have various ways of 
conceptualizing substantive citizenship. In some states, it might be strongly tied to 
cultural identity and language.80 In other states, it might be linked to political ideals 
or religion.81 In the U.S., it may be a basic sense of shared political identity. It is 
important to note that this Article does not undertake a detailed description or 
normative model of substantive citizenship in the United States or in any other state. 
Such inquiries may be found elsewhere.82 This Article’s purpose is to create a 
                                                      
Conference: Who Cares?: Gender and Citizenship in the European Union 3 (June 2–5, 1999), 
http://aei.pitt.edu/2324/1/002596_1.PDF [https://perma.cc/86WG-7V3T] (arguing that thick 
citizenship indicates active political and community engagement and the extent of 
transactions, rights, and obligations). 
77 Román, supra note 62, at 572; see Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 19, at 369 
(“Citizenship is not just a certain status, defined by a set of rights and responsibilities. It is 
also an identity, an expression of one’s membership in a political community.”); see also 
DEREK HEATER, CITIZENSHIP: THE CIVIC IDEAL IN WORLD HISTORY, POLITICS AND 
EDUCATION 187 (3d ed. 2004) (“Citizenship is more than a label. He who has no sense of a 
civic bond with his fellows or of some responsibility for civic welfare is not a true citizen 
whatever his legal status. Identity and virtue invest the concept of citizenship with power.”). 
78 See HEATER, supra note 77, at 187 (“The interests which unite a group are often 
cultural—a sense of tradition, ethnicity or way of life.”); WALZER, supra note 7, at 52 
(arguing that current members have a right to decide the criteria for admission to 
membership). 
79 Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 19, at 353; William Safran, Citizenship and 
Nationality in Democratic Systems: Approaches to Defining and Acquiring Membership in 
the Political Community, 18 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 313, 313 (1997) (“In a more general sense, 
[citizenship] also refers to a person’s moral quality as exemplified by his or her 
behavior . . . .”). 
80 JAMES P. LYNCH & RITA J. SIMON, IMMIGRATION THE WORLD OVER: STATUTES, 
POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 213–15 (2003). 
81 Some commentators, for example, have characterized U.S. citizenship (or, more 
specifically for purposes of this paper, substantive citizenship) with reference to political 
ideals. See, e.g., Safran, supra note 79, at 318 (“‘Americanness’ was defined in terms of a 
commitment to democracy, equality, and other values, as anchored in the U.S. 
Constitution . . . .”).  
82 See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 7, at 52 (discussing the meaning of membership in 
political communities and the differences between immigration and naturalization); Bosniak, 
supra note 35, at 449 (questioning whether citizenship as a concept can only ever be 
national); Linda Bosniak, Varieties of Citizenship, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2449, 2449 (2007) 
(discussing the concept of national citizenship in the alienage setting); Matthew Lister, 
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framework that applies to many different conceptions of substantive citizenship and 
many different types of citizenship rules. Here, I analyze the ways in which formal 
citizenship may relate to substantive citizenship, whatever its content and contours, 
particularly in a system of coexisting citizenship rules. 
Regardless of the precise contours of the state’s substantive citizenship, the 
assumption is that citizens share or ought to share some fundamental quality or 
identity that affects  
 
how they view potentially competing forms of national, regional, ethnic, 
or religious identities; their ability to tolerate and work together with 
others who are different from themselves; their desire to participate in the 
political process in order to promote the public good and hold political 
authorities accountable; their willingness to show self-restraint and 
exercise personal responsibility in their economic demands and in 
personal choices which affect their health and environment.83 
 
In sum, substantive citizenship is a sense of belonging and shared identity that binds 
individual members of the state together. Whether that sense of belonging is based 
solely on a shared commitment to a democratic ideal, a strong sense of shared 
history, or an attachment to a shared territory, substantive citizenship ideally gives 
shape to the collective citizenry. 
 
B.  U.S. Citizenship Law: Unequal Paths to Equal Rights? 
 
Though citizens exercise equal rights and—at least ideally—share a sense of 
belonging and membership, they do not obtain citizenship in the same way. To the 
contrary, states employ a variety of rules to distinguish citizens from noncitizens. In 
fact, multiple paths to citizenship, each with very different requirements, may 
coexist within a single state. In virtually all states, birthright citizenship rules have 
naturalization counterparts. Such is the case in the United States. Some are citizens 
by virtue of birth within U.S. territory84 or birth to U.S. citizen parents,85 and others 
become citizens after fulfilling naturalization requirements.86 Though all these paths 
rely on different criteria, they confer the very same citizenship and the very same 
rights on those who satisfy their criteria.  
  
                                                      
Citizenship, in the Immigration Context, 70 MD. L. REV. 175, 175 (2010) (investigating what 
substantive citizenship means in the context of children).  
83 Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 19, at 352–53. 
84 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
85 See I.N.A. §§ 301, 309, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409 (2012). 
86 See I.N.A. § 316, 8 U.S.C. § 1423. 
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1.  U.S. Citizenship Law: A Triad 
 
U.S. citizenship law provides three main avenues for the acquisition of 
citizenship: birthright citizenship based on birth in the United States, naturalization, 
and birthright citizenship based on birth to a U.S. citizen parent.  
 
(a)  Territorial Birthright Citizenship 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[a]ll persons born . . . in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . . .”87 
Some commentators have suggested that the requirement that an individual be 
“subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States at birth imposes additional 
requirements besides mere birth within the territory.88 But these arguments have not 
gained traction; the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause has been interpreted 
to require the bestowal of citizenship on every individual born within United States 
territory.89 The rule is strictly territorial in nature. Thus under even a single rule, the 
U.S. version of jus soli—territorial birthright citizenship—a wide spectrum of 
individuals become citizens of the United States.  
 
(b)  Naturalization 
 
The Constitution also contemplates a path to citizenship after birth, and Article 
I specifically assigns the power to regulate naturalization to Congress.90 The 
Immigration and Nationality Act details the requirements.91 Broadly speaking,92 an 
individual may apply for naturalization by showing that he has resided in the United 
States for five years, has been physically present in the United States for two and a 
half years, is of good moral character, is attached to the principles of the 
Constitution, has basic proficiency in the English language, and has a basic 
                                                      
87 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
88 See, e.g., SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 116–19. 
89 Supreme Court dicta supports this view. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 
649, 699, 705 (1898) (holding that a child born in the United States to Chinese nationals, 
who were ineligible to naturalize, was a U.S. citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment). Two 
universally accepted exceptions to the Fourteenth Amendment’s territorial birthright 
citizenship clause exist—neither the children of enemy aliens nor the children of diplomats 
are U.S. citizens despite being born on U.S. soil. See Garrett Epps, The Citizenship Clause: 
A “Legislative History,” 60 AM. U. L. REV. 331, 338 n.30 (2010). 
90 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
91 See I.N.A. § 316, 8 U.S.C. § 1423. 
92 Some of the requirements of naturalization vary in certain instances. For example, 
spouses of U.S. citizens have a shorter residency requirement than others, and long-term 
residents may apply for naturalization without fulfilling the language, history, and civics 
requirement after reaching a certain age. See I.N.A. § 316, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1422–23, 1430. 
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understanding of U.S. history and civics.93 If approved, the process culminates in a 
citizenship ceremony where the applicant takes an oath of allegiance to the United 
States.94 
 
(c)  Birthright Citizenship Based on Parent’s Citizenship 
 
Rules granting citizenship to infants born outside of the United States to U.S. 
citizen parents form the third leg of the U.S. citizenship law triad. These rules allow 
for children to essentially inherit the citizenship of their parents. Though these rules 
can broadly be characterized as jus sanguinis, they do not rely entirely on the 
citizenship of the parent. Current citizenship rules provide for U.S. citizenship to 
foreign-born children of U.S. citizens only where the U.S. citizen parent has resided 
in or been physically present in the United States prior to the birth of the child.95 The 
length of residence or physical presence required varies depending on whether the 
child is born in wedlock and on whether the U.S. citizen parent is the child’s mother 
or father. A child born out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen mother, for example, is a 
U.S. citizen if the mother was physically present in the United States for at least one 
year prior to the birth of the child.96 A child born to a married U.S. citizen father and 
noncitizen mother is a U.S. citizen only if the father has been physically present in 
the United States for at least five years, two of which were after the age of fifteen.97 
A child born to two U.S. citizen parents is a U.S. citizen if at least one of the parents 
had a residence of any length in the U.S. prior to the birth of the child.98 
                                                      
93 See I.N.A. § 316, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1422–23, 1427. 
94 See I.N.A. § 337, 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (requiring a naturalization applicant to take a public 
oath of allegiance). 
95 See I.N.A. § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401. 
96 See I.N.A. § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401. 
97 See I.N.A. § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401. An unwed U.S. citizen father must also satisfy a 
series of requirements that are inapplicable to mothers wishing to pass on citizenship to their 
children. Unwed fathers must establish a blood relationship with the child; agree, in writing, 
to financially support the child until age eighteen; and establish parentage in court, either 
through legitimation, a written and sworn acknowledgment of paternity, or court 
adjudication. I.N.A. § 309, 8 U.SC. §1409. The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the 
constitutionality of the more burdensome requirements for fathers wishing to pass on U.S. 
citizenship to their children born out of wedlock, citing a legitimate interest in a 
“demonstrated opportunity or potential to develop not just a relationship that is recognized, 
as a formal matter, by the law, but one that consists of the real, everyday ties that provide a 
connection between child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States.” Nguyen v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 64–65 (2001). 
98 U.S. law also provides a mechanism for noncitizen children to automatically become 
U.S. citizens under certain conditions. Noncitizen children who reside in the United States 
as legal permanent residents with at least one U.S. citizen parent automatically become U.S. 
citizens. See I.N.A. § 320, 8 U.S.C. § 1431. Noncitizen children who are temporarily 
admitted to the United States may apply for a certificate of citizenship if a U.S. citizen parent 
or grandparent has met certain U.S. residency requirements. See I.N.A. § 322, 8 U.S.C. § 
1433. These rules affect children in many different situations. Under these rules, a child may 
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2.  The Citizenship Paradox 
 
“Laws of citizenship and immigration do more than regulate the entry and the 
status of non-citizens; they reveal much about how a nation conceives of itself.”99 
What, then, do U.S. citizenship rules tell us about how the United States conceives 
of itself? The variety of paths to citizenship results in a wide spectrum of citizens. 
Consider the following examples:  
 
A is a two-day-old infant born in Ohio. Her parents are French immigrants 
living lawfully and permanently in the United States. Because A was born 
in the United States, she is a U.S. citizen. 
 
B is a Vietnamese schoolteacher. When he became eligible for 
naturalization a few years ago, he applied. As part of the naturalization 
process, B had to demonstrate basic English proficiency, knowledge of 
U.S. history and civics, and five years of residence in the United States, 
among other things. Because he successfully completed the naturalization 
process, B acquired U.S. citizenship. 
 
C is a five-year-old child living in Argentina. She was born in Argentina 
a year after her parents—both of them U.S. citizens—moved there to work 
at the foreign branch of a U.S.-based company. Because C’s parents are 
U.S. citizens who had a residence in the United States prior to C’s birth, C 
acquired U.S. citizenship at birth. 
 
While the existence of multiple methods of acquiring the same right is 
interesting in and of itself, it is not unique. Other areas of law employ a similar 
structure. Individuals may acquire the “bundle of rights” associated with real 
property ownership, for instance, by formal transfer of title or through adverse 
                                                      
automatically become a U.S. citizen upon a parent’s naturalization. In addition, an adopted 
child who entered as a legal permanent resident automatically becomes a citizen upon 
establishing a residence in the United States with an adoptive U.S. citizen parent. These rules 
draw from U.S. jus soli and jus sanguinis rules in that they look to parentage and territorial 
presence in the United States. However, they confer citizenship after birth and therefore act 
much like categorical naturalization rules. Because these mechanisms depend on or mirror 
one of the three main forms of citizenship acquisition discussed in this Article, I do not 
discuss them separately. 
99 Daniel Kanstroom, Wer Sind Wir Wieder? Laws of Asylum, Immigration, and 
Citizenship in the Struggle for the Soul of the New Germany, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 155, 158 
(1993) (citation omitted). 
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possession.100 In many legal regimes, including a handful of U.S. states,101 the law 
recognizes a couple as married if an individual authorized by the state marries them 
through a process outlined by the law or if they openly cohabitate for a certain 
number of years as spouses.102  
While many might object to some of these alternative methods of acquiring 
property rights and/or marriage rights, it is reasonably easy to articulate a common 
theme that runs through each system of disparate rules. Property law, the argument 
might go, ought to incentivize and protect individuals’ improvement of land in a way 
that maximizes its utility.103 By recognizing the ownership of an individual who paid 
money or other consideration for land, the law protects and coincides with that 
individual’s vested interest in maximizing the benefit of that land.104 Likewise, an 
individual who has been in possession of the land has a vested interest in its utility 
                                                      
100 See 3 AM. JUR. 2D Adverse Possession § 1 (2013) (explaining that individuals may 
acquire the bundle of rights through adverse possession); 72 AM. JUR. 2D Statute of Frauds 
§ 60 (2012) (explaining that individuals may acquire the bundle of rights through the statute 
of frauds).  
101 Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Texas, and the District of Columbia still recognized common-law marriage as of 
2012. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2502 (Supp. 2014); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 20-1-100 (2006); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401 (West 2006); Creel v. Creel, 
763 So. 2d 943, 946 (Ala. 2000); Johnson v. Young, 372 A.2d 992, 994 (D.C. 1977); In re 
Marriage of Martin, 681 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Iowa 2004); In re Estate of Ober, 62 P.3d 1114, 
1115 (Mont. 2003); In re Estate of Stinchcomb, 674 P.2d 26, 28–29 (Okla. 1983) (per 
curiam); DeMelo v. Zompa, 844 A.2d 174, 177–78 (R.I. 2004) (per curiam). New Hampshire 
recognizes common-law marriage only at death. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (2006). 
Utah recognized common-law marriage by statute in 1987 in an effort to combat welfare 
fraud. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (West 2013). 
102 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5 (stating that couples are legally and validly 
married if a court or administrative agency establishes a marriage based on ceremony or 
cohabitation).  
103 See Carol Necole Brown & Serena M. Williams, Rethinking Adverse Possession: 
An Essay on Ownership and Possession, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 583, 584–85 (2010) 
(describing various normative rationales for adverse possession as consistent with an overall 
goal of efficiency and fairness); John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse 
Possession, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 816, 840–42 (1994) (describing and ultimately critiquing 
the “development model” of adverse possession: “Under the development model, adverse 
possession functions to facilitate the economic exploitation of land.”); see also ROBERT 
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 156 (1988) (noting that adverse possession 
tends to redistribute property to higher-valued uses); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 70 (3d ed. 1986) (explaining that a property has more utility if the adverse 
possessor keeps the property); Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 55, 61–62 (1987) (arguing that in the context of boundary disputes, 
particularly in urban areas, the adverse possessor places a higher value on the disputed land 
than does the record owner). 
104 Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 847–49 (2009). 
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and therefore is likely to improve it to maximize utility.105 Similar reasoning might 
be applied in the context of marriage. If marriage helps further individual family 
members’ economic and social well-being,106 then that purpose can be achieved by 
allowing individuals to claim legal protections afforded by marriage in a formal legal 
ceremony or by bestowing those rights on individuals already living such an 
arrangement.  
Citizenship rules operate in much the same way, but their commonality is much 
harder to discern than that of property acquisition and marriage rules. The 
hypothetical U.S. citizens above help illustrate this point. Two things are worth 
noting about them. First, it is difficult to identify a commonality among these 
individuals that would suggest they are equally qualified for citizenship. Though B, 
the Vietnamese schoolteacher, was required to demonstrate basic English 
proficiency and knowledge of U.S. history and civics, A, the Ohio-born baby, cannot 
speak at all and knows nothing of history and civics. In fact, there is no guarantee 
that A would ever be able to meet the same requirements that B met in order to be 
naturalized. The only thing that A and B seem to share, aside from their citizenship, 
is their residence in the United States. But they do not share this with C, who lives 
in Argentina. And there is no guarantee that C will ever set foot in the United States. 
All three individuals, however, are entitled to the same citizenship despite qualifying 
under different rules.  
A second observation worth noting is that none of these hypotheticals is 
particularly controversial in the political realm. Few legislators or politicians would 
raise objections to any of these individuals acquiring citizenship or call into question 
the legitimacy of their citizenship. This is important. It helps illustrate the 
paradoxical nature of the rules. I have crafted these hypotheticals such that the 
individuals are sufficiently different to show that U.S. citizenship rules make 
citizens of very different individuals. But these hypothetical individuals are unlikely 
to trigger a visceral reaction against their citizenship. How can each of these 
individuals be legitimately entitled to citizenship despite their very different 
qualifications?107 
                                                      
105 For an argument that the uncertainty of adverse possession prior to actual settlement 
of title results in less efficiency and social utility, see generally Brown & Williams, supra 
note 103, at 583–88 (stating that adverse possession should be abrogated as a way of 
divesting owners of title because adverse possession is not the most fair and efficient 
outcome). For an argument that the utilitarian underpinnings of the adverse possession 
doctrine are not consistent with the modern need to protect the environment, see generally 
Sprankling, supra note 103, at 817 (exploring the relationship between adverse possession 
and environmental preservation).  
106 See Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. 
REV. 1625, 1637–38 (2007); Maggie Gallagher, What Is Marriage For? The Public Purposes 
of Marriage Law, 62 LA. L. REV. 773, 781–82 (2002). 
107 There are a number of other hypotheticals I could raise to illustrate the point that 
U.S. law distributes citizenship to a broad spectrum of individuals. In fact, the asymmetry 
between disparate citizenship rules becomes more pronounced if we consider other examples 
more likely to elicit controversy. Consider the following: 
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If we assume that U.S. citizenship rules do or should conform to intuitive 
principles of membership and Walzerian notions of distributive justice, 108 then the 
rules by which a state confers citizenship should somehow correspond to the essence 
of citizenship. More specifically, if citizenship confers the same rights and 
obligations on all citizens equally, we would expect citizenship rules to identify 
individuals who are equally desirable for citizenship. But the relationship between 
citizenship rules and the rights and obligations attached to citizenship is not obvious. 
Neither is the relationship between citizenship rules and the more substantive notion 
of belonging inherent in substantive citizenship obvious. What kinds of individuals 
are good candidates for citizenship, and do the state’s citizenship rules adequately 
identify them? Do the requirements of naturalization guarantee an individual’s sense 
of shared identity with other citizens? How does birth within national territory 
qualify infants for the same citizenship that naturalized citizens receive? 
                                                      
 
1. D is a thirty-five-year-old software engineer who was born in the United States 
while her mother, an Italian citizen, was on vacation in Florida. Six weeks later, 
D traveled to Italy with her mother. D has never returned to the United States. 
Because D was born in the United States, he is a U.S. citizen.  
 
2. E is a child living in Afghanistan. He was born in Afghanistan to an unwed 
U.S. citizen mother. E’s mother has never been in the United States except for a 
year she spent studying English there. Because E’s mother is a U.S. citizen who 
spent at least one year in the United States, E is a U.S. citizen. This remains the 
case even if E’s mother acquired citizenship in the same way E did. 
 
3. F is a wealthy business owner. For the last five years, F has been spending half 
the year in his native Sweden and half the year in his vacation home in Maine. To 
eliminate the need for renewing permanent visas and to gain advantage under 
Swedish and U.S. tax laws, F naturalized. As a result, F is a U.S. citizen. F 
continues to split his time between the United States and Sweden.  
 
These hypotheticals certainly highlight the variety of individuals that U.S. citizenship 
rules designate citizens. But they do not highlight the paradox of equal citizenship on unequal 
terms because they raise questions of legitimacy from some groups. That is, from some 
viewpoints, the paradox would simply be a result of bad rules that need to be fixed. I prefer 
to focus on hypotheticals that do not trigger calls for change in order to make some sense out 
of the current system. However, I believe that what we learn from these less controversial 
examples will help give structure to discussions about the more controversial examples. 
108 Interestingly, Walzer argues that all individuals within a state’s territory must have 
access to citizenship. For Walzer, rules of immigration serve as the sorting mechanisms for 
political membership. Thus, the notion of political membership is tied, in the first instance, 
to immigration regulation: “The members of a political community have a collective right to 
shape the resident population—a right subject always to . . . the meaning of membership to 
the current members and the principle of mutual aid.” WALZER, supra note 7, at 52. 
“Immigration, then, is both a matter of political choice and moral constraint. Naturalization, 
by contrast, is entirely constrained: every new immigrant, every refugee taken in, every 
resident and worker must be offered the opportunities of citizenship.” Id. at 62. 
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3.  The Citizenship Paradox and Modern Citizenship Scholarship 
 
I believe that much academic commentary on citizenship results from the 
tensions inherent in the notion of unequal citizenship rules leading to equal 
citizenship. The literature on child citizenship, for example, attempts to reconcile 
children’s formal citizenship—usually acquired under birthright citizenship rules—
with their temporarily diminished capacities.109 Many of the rights exclusive to 
citizenship are inaccessible to children. Children are legally ineligible to vote, serve 
on juries, or run for public office. Few argue that these rights should be available to 
children,110 and some have argued that children cannot be accurately described as 
citizens at all.111 But some have affirmed children’s citizenship and criticized the 
assumption that children are “citizens in the making”112 rather than full citizens.113 
These commentators call for expanded rights for children. Some, for example, have 
explored children’s diminished citizenship rights in the immigration arena. While 
adult citizens may initiate the immigration process for relatives, child citizens may 
not.114 More concerning for these commentators is the de facto deportation of citizen 
children.115 Broadly speaking, the scholarship on citizen children highlights the 
reality that not all citizens are identically qualified to exercise citizenship rights and 
obligations despite being citizens.  
Likewise, critiques of birthright citizenship are inherently rooted in the paradox 
of equal citizenship (and the resulting rights of citizenship) distributed on unequal 
                                                      
109 TOM COCKBURN, RETHINKING CHILDREN’S CITIZENSHIP 1 (2013) (“Perhaps, 
‘children’s citizenship’ is a misnomer, as children are in some respects ‘not citizens’: they 
have not ‘come of age’ and consequently do not have many of the privileges (such as full 
voting rights) or the obligations (such as full financial responsibility) that adults hold.”). 
110 Roche, supra note 14, at 487 (“Save for the ‘child liberationists’, no one is arguing 
that children are identical to adults or that they should enjoy exactly the same bundle of civil 
and political rights as adults.” (citation omitted)); see also Cohen, supra note 15, at 221 
(arguing for a reconceptualization of children’s citizenship to more adequately reflect their 
diminished capacities and protect important rights). But see Planned Parenthood of Cent. 
Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (“Constitutional rights do not mature and come into 
being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as 
adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.”). 
111 John Locke, for example, argued that a government based on consent could not 
bestow citizenship on children. Children, he claimed, are not born into the compact. Under 
this view, children may not develop a national identity until adulthood. JOHN LOCKE, TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 300–01 (Division of Gryphon ed., The Legal Classics Library 
1994) (1690). 
112 See Lister, supra note 14, at 696 (quoting MARSHALL, supra note 18, at 25).  
113 Bhabha, supra note 14, at 56 (“There seems to be an assumption that children’s 
disabilities as citizens are self-evidently justified, a consequence of the fact that they are 
citizens in the making, ‘future’ rather than actual citizens.”). 
114 Id. (describing children’s diminished ability to petition for noncitizen relatives). 
115 Id. at 54 (describing circumstances under which citizen children are constructively 
deported from the state due to a parent’s deportability). 
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terms. Some commentators, for instance, have claimed that citizenship based on 
birth within the state’s territory makes an arbitrary and unjust distinction between 
individuals who are equally desirable as members of the polity, but were born on 
different sides of the border.116 Some question whether birth within the national 
territory, by itself, is sufficiently related to the rights and responsibilities of 
citizenship to justify the bestowal of citizenship. Thus, under these arguments, 
birthright citizenship based on birth within U.S. territory is, at worst, a tool of 
exclusion that disenfranchises underprivileged groups117 or, at best, a relic of history 
that rewards the lucky and incentivizes unauthorized immigration.118 Scholars have 
proposed solutions that range from requiring individuals born in the United States 
to confirm citizenship as adults through a process resembling naturalization119 to 
limiting birthright citizenship to those born to U.S. citizen parents.120 Underlying 
these solutions is a desire to mitigate the effect of a single citizenship rule that 
appears to sometimes result in citizenship for an individual who is not similar 
enough to those who obtain citizenship through other citizenship rules. 
Even broader, more abstract, discussions of citizenship tend to focus on 
particular facets of citizenship. Scholars, for instance, have explored citizenship as 
                                                      
116 See generally Shachar, supra note 7, at 369 (arguing that birthright citizenship is an 
unjust system of inherited property insufficiently tied to a principled notion of political 
membership); Angela Kim, Recent Development, Development in the Legislative Branch: 
The Growing Movement to Redefine Birthright Citizenship and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 757, 757 (2011) (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
establishment of birthright citizenship); William M. Stevens, Comment, Jurisdiction, 
Allegiance, and Consent: Revisiting the Forgotten Prong of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Birthright Citizenship Clause in Light of Terrorism, Unprecedented Modern Population 
Migrations, Globalization, and Conflicting Cultures, 14 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 337, 389 
(2008) (suggesting that the birthright citizenship clause be modified to apply to only children 
of citizens or permanent residents). 
117 See SHKLAR, supra note 21, at 3. 
118 SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 9–10; Charles Wood, Losing Control of 
America’s Future—The Census, Birthright Citizenship, and Illegal Aliens, 22 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 465, 497 (1999); Stevens, supra note 116, at 349.  
119 See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 117; see also Joy Pepi Wiesenfeld, Note, 
The Conditional Nature of Derivative Citizenship, 8 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 345, 357–58 (1975) 
(recommending the requirement of an oath of allegiance to the United States upon the age of 
majority for children wishing to keep citizenship inherited from U.S. citizen parents).  
120 See, e.g., Kim, supra note 116, at 757; Stevens, supra note 116, at 383–84; see also 
Birthright Citizenship Act of 2013, H.R. 140, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013) (proposing to amend 
section 301 of the Immigration and Nationality Act to clarify who qualifies for birthright 
citizenship); Birthright Citizenship Act of 2011, S. 723, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011) (same); 
Birthright Citizenship Act of 2009, H.R. 1868, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (same); H.R. 126, 
111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (proposing to amend section 301 of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act by limiting birthright citizenship to persons with a legal resident mother); Citizenship 
Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 133, 110th Cong. §§ 2, 3 (2007) (proposing to amend section 301 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act by “denying citizenship at birth for children of non-
citizen, non-permanent resident aliens”). 
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rights,121 citizenship as participation,122 citizenship as work,123 citizenship as 
standing,124 and citizenship as identity.125 Each of these illuminates an important 
                                                      
121 MARSHALL, supra note 18, at 8–9; T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of 
Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1471, 1484-88 (1986); Bosniak, supra note 35, at 463-70 
(addressing citizenship as rights and stating that “[i]n twentieth-century social theory, the 
notion of citizenship has been most closely associated with the enjoyment of certain 
important rights and entitlements”). 
122 See Bosniak, supra note 35, at 470-79 (addressing citizenship as political activity 
and stating that “[a]s political theorists use the term, ‘citizenship’ most commonly denotes 
active engagement in the life of the political community”); Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: 
Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1977) (arguing 
that, to the ancient Greeks, “[t]o be a citizen is not merely to be a consumer of rights, but to 
be responsible to other members of the community”); Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 19, 
at 353 (describing one meaning of citizenship as “citizenship-as-desirable-activity, where the 
extent and quality of one’s citizenship is a function of one’s participation in that 
community”); Malinda L. Seymore, The Presidency and the Meaning of Citizenship, 2005 
BYU L. REV. 927, 965-69 (2005) (exploring the link between citizenship and political 
participation). 
123 See, e.g., Linda Bosniak, Citizenship and Work, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 
497, 501 (2002); James W. Fox, Jr., Liberalism, Democratic Citizenship, and Welfare 
Reform: The Troubling Case of Workfare, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 103, 105 (1996) (stating that 
supporters of ‘workfare’ reforms believe that ‘workfare’ aid recipients “will attain equal 
social citizenship by performing the primary obligation of citizenship: work.”); Gordon & 
Lenhardt, supra note 20, at 1161. See generally LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND 
ENTITLEMENT: THE SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP, at ix (1986) (suggesting that the 
pervasiveness of welfare problems can be solved through citizen work requirements). 
124 See, e.g., SHKLAR, supra note 21, at 2; Sofya Aptekar, Citizenship Status and 
Patterns of Inequality in the United States and Canada, 95 SOC. SCI. Q. 343, 356–57 (2013) 
(“Persistent and large inequalities in citizenship leave the already disadvantaged unskilled 
immigrants without access to rights, representation, security, or job and educational 
opportunities.”); Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CALIF. L. 
REV. 373, 412–16 (2004); Kevin Lapp, Reforming the Good Moral Character Requirement 
for U.S. Citizenship, 87 IND. L.J. 1571, 1574 (2012) (arguing that the current enforcement of 
this naturalization requirement “force[s] legal resident immigrants with criminal histories to 
permanently live in the shadows of full citizenship, never able to possess the . . . respect that 
citizenship can bring.”); Michael T. Light et al., Citizenship and Punishment: The Salience 
of National Membership in U.S. Criminal Courts, 79 AM. SOC. REV. 825, 825 (2014) 
(“[C]itizenship status is a salient predictor of sentencing outcomes [in criminal 
prosecutions]—more powerful than race or ethnicity.”); Eileen Díaz McConnell, Hurdles or 
Walls? Nativity, Citizenship, Legal Status and Latino Homeownership in Los Angeles, 53 
SOC. SCI. RES. 19, 21 (2015) (“Many studies report that citizen immigrants have higher 
homeownership rates than non-citizen immigrants.”); Scott E. Wolfe et al., Unraveling the 
Effect of Offender Citizenship Status on Federal Sentencing Outcomes, 40 SOC. SCI. RES. 
349, 349 (2010) (“[B]oth legal and illegal aliens have a higher probability of incarceration 
than similarly-situated US citizens.”). 
125 See RUTH LISTER, CITIZENSHIP: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 3 (2d ed. 2003) (“The 
notion of citizenship identity derives from the most basic meaning of citizenship: 
membership of a community . . . .”); Bosniak, supra note 35, at 479-88 (addressing 
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dimension of membership in the polity, but treats each without sufficient reference 
to the others and therefore fails to account for the relationships among them, 
especially the relationship between substantive and formal dimensions. This is 
perhaps due, at least in part, to the difficulty of explaining why formal citizenship 
rules do not always coincide with many of these facets of citizenship. Citizenship 
rules, after all, do not necessarily distribute formal citizenship to individuals who 
base their identity on that citizenship or who participate in the polity, and noncitizens 
may be just as likely to identify with a state or participate in the polity as their citizen 
counterparts.  
While some citizenship inquiries have seemingly orbited around the paradox 
without touching down on it,126 no one has offered an explanation or resolution of 
that paradox. 
 
4.  Addressing the Citizenship Paradox 
 
Broadly speaking, there are two alternative ways of addressing the apparent 
paradox of equal citizenship distributed on unequal terms. First, one might simply 
attribute the existence of dissonant citizenship rules to meaningless accidents of 
history. Under this view, one might conclude that existing U.S. citizenship rules are 
arbitrary and unjust. Second, one might instead view the existence of disparate 
citizenship rules as somehow meaningful in itself. Under this view, one might distill 
some insight about citizenship from an analysis of the system as a whole. 
In this Article I take the second approach. Part IV below proposes a framework 
for understanding citizenship that resolves the apparent paradox described in this 
Part. In that sense, this Article advances the notion that there is a legitimate rationale 
for the apparent paradoxical distribution of citizenship and that individual 
citizenship rules are integral pieces of a cohesive system. Individual citizenship rules 
                                                      
citizenship as identity/solidarity and discussing “citizenship’s psychological dimension, that 
part of citizenship that describes the affective ties of identification and solidarity that we 
maintain with groups of other people in the world.” (citation omitted)); Helen Elizabeth 
Hartnell, Belonging: Citizenship and Migration in the European Union and in Germany, 24 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 330, 345 (2006); Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 19, at 353; Seymore, 
supra note 122, at 958-64 (exploring naturalized citizenship as identity); Nora Graham, 
Note, Patriot Act II and Denationalization: An Unconstitutional Attempt to Revive Stripping 
Americans of Their Citizenship, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 593, 618 (2004-05) (discussing the 
consequences of losing citizenship when “the [Supreme] Court considers citizenship to be 
the equivalent to a person’s social and political identity” (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
101 (1958))).  
126 Noah M.J. Pickus, To Make Natural: Creating Citizens for the Twenty-First 
Century, in IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 107, 123 (Noah 
M.J. Pickus ed., 1998) (evaluating U.S. naturalization law’s capacity to create a common 
national identity and asking: “Why, simply because they were born in the United States, 
should legal residents be entitled to the rights of citizenship, especially participation in 
governance? In particular, why should alienated residents, citizens who know little and care 
less about the polity, be entitled to citizenship, while committed and knowledgeable aliens 
are denied it?”). 
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have admittedly arisen at different times and for different reasons in a way that might 
seem to weigh against studying them together as a whole. However, those individual 
rules have enjoyed significant longevity—the U.S., for example, has included some 
version of jus soli, jus sanguinis, and naturalization since its founding. As a result, 
citizenship rules have had ample time to yield to a public sense of a just distribution 
of citizenship. Citizenship rules, in other words, provide some evidence of what U.S. 
citizens, through their representatives, have believed to be an appropriate and just 
way to distribute citizenship.  
In any event, even if citizenship rules do not reflect any coherent understanding 
of citizenship or just distribution—if they are truly accidents of history—the 
discussion that follows in Part IV can be read as a framework for discussing the 
potential functions of citizenship and evaluating the current U.S. citizenship system. 
That is to say, the discussion in Part IV need not depend on the assumption that 
citizenship rules have developed, in the first instance, around the framework 
proposed below.  
 
IV.  THE CITIZENSHIP MAP 
 
The apparent paradox created by varying citizenship rules results from an 
incomplete understanding of citizenship. Discussions about citizenship build on two 
related but flawed premises. First, some scholars have failed to sufficiently 
distinguish between substantive and formal citizenship and have assumed that 
formal citizenship does or should coincide with substantive citizenship.127 At first 
glance, this seems like a reasonable position. In the complete absence of substantive 
citizenship, formal citizenship becomes a meaningless entitlement to shared rights 
despite a lack of shared identity or sense of membership. However, the reality is that 
many citizenship rules, in the United States and elsewhere, do not require a 
concurrence of formal and substantive citizenship.  
U.S. citizenship law diverges significantly from coinciding formal and 
substantive citizenship. U.S. citizenship law does not ensure that formal citizens are 
also substantive citizens (i.e., individuals who have developed substantive 
citizenship). After all, it is untenable to say that the Ohio-born and Argentina-born 
children of my hypotheticals above exhibit some quality—like loyalty or a sense of 
shared culture—with other citizens from the moment of birth. It is also unlikely that 
naturalization ensures that naturalized citizens have acquired all the requisite 
fundamental qualities of substantive citizenship. This is especially the case in states 
that, like the United States, impose a relatively small burden on naturalization 
applicants. But I do not believe this is a failure of U.S. citizenship law. Rather, it is 
a potential strength. Citizenship rules should not exclusively aim to make formal 
citizens of those that are already substantive citizens. A rigid coupling of formal and 
substantive citizenship fails to account for the transformative power of citizenship. 
Formal citizenship can facilitate and promote substantive citizenship, as I will 
explain below in section IV.B. 
                                                      
127 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.  
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The second flawed premise of many citizenship discussions relates to and 
depends on the first. Because scholars often focus on the rights of citizenship—
citizenship as the final rung on an ascending ladder of rights128—citizenship 
sometimes appears to be a static condition or the culmination of substantive 
citizenship. Public rhetoric often echoes this notion. Politicians speak of a “path to 
citizenship”129 in a way that suggests citizenship is a final destination. This has 
intuitive appeal. After all, citizens enjoy the full package of rights and benefits 
offered by the state; there is no category of persons with more rights and benefits.130 
                                                      
128 See, e.g., Bosniak, supra note 35, at 450–51 (“Virtually everyone in the debates 
treats citizenship as embodying the highest normative value. The term rings unmistakably 
with the promise of personal engagement, community well-being, and democratic 
fulfillment.” (citation omitted)); Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American: The DREAM Act, 
Immigration Reform and Citizenship, 14 NEV. L.J. 101, 122 (2013) (“[T]he DREAMers have 
also had to contend with the fact that there is no existing path to help them realize their goal 
of matching their identity as Americans to a legal status as U.S. citizens. The absolute lack 
of a path to regularize their immigration status means that, for DREAMers, there is no 
possibility (yet) for transitioning to the ultimate, full membership of citizenship . . . .”); Juliet 
Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. 
REV. 367, 398 (2006) (“Immigration law defines membership in this society explicitly, by 
establishing a ladder of accession to permanent residence and then formal U.S. citizenship, 
and a set of criteria to determine whether an individual meets the requirements for these 
various levels of membership.”).  
129 See, e.g., Josh Hicks, Sen. Ted Cruz Calls Path to Citizenship ‘Profoundly Unfair,’ 
WASH. POST (July 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2013/ 
07/21/sen-ted-cruz-calls-path-to-citizenship-profoundly-unfair/ [https://perma.cc/RTR6-
5KY3] (quoting Senator Ted Cruz as saying, “I think a path to citizenship for those who are 
here illegally is profoundly unfair to the millions of legal immigrants who followed the 
rules . . . .”); Annie Karni, Bill Clinton: Path to Citizenship Is Just Common Sense, 
POLITICO (May 12, 2015, 1:01 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/bill-clinton-
immigration-citizenship-path-117856.html [https://perma.cc/3RN8-H5C6] (quoting former 
President Bill Clinton as saying, “I think the only thing that makes sense is a path to 
citizenship and adequate support for children . . . .”); Seth McLaughlin, Jeb Bush’s 
Immigration Evolution: Earned Legal Status but No Path to Citizenship, WASH. TIMES (July 
8, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/8/jeb-bush-no-illegal-immigrant-
path-to-citizenship-/?page=all [https://perma.cc/K6N4-5UYP] (quoting former Secretary of 
State Hillary Rodham Clinton as saying, “[Jeb Bush] doesn’t believe in a path to citizenship. 
If he did at one time, he no longer does . . . .”); Charlie Spiering, Chris Christie: No ‘Special 
Way’ for Illegal Immigrants to Get U.S. Citizenship, BREITBART (July 20, 2015), 
http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/07/20/chris-christie-no-special-way-for-
illegal-immigrants-to-get-u-s-citizenship/ [https://perma.cc/KB5K-DLKP] (quoting New 
Jersey Governor Chris Christie as saying, “I think, you know, Secretary Clinton talks about 
[a] path to citizenship for people who are here illegally—she’s just pandering . . . . ”); Earned 
Citizenship, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/immigration/ 
earned-citizenship [https://perma.cc/5ZQK-S35D] (quoting President Barack Obama as 
saying that “[w]e’ve got to lay out a path [to citizenship for individuals who are here 
illegally] . . . .”).  
130 Lowell W. Barrington, The Making of Citizenship Policy in the Baltic States, 13 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 159, 161 (1999) (“[C]itizenship is . . . the highest form of official 
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Moreover, immigration rules can be viewed as a transitional mechanism that leads 
individuals to the ultimate goal of citizenship.131 Here, I propose that formal 
citizenship continues the transition. A static view of citizenship ignores the reality 
that formal citizenship does not necessarily equate with substantive citizenship. 
Formal citizens have varying levels of substantive citizenship at the time they 
acquire citizenship, formal citizens can develop substantive citizenship after 
obtaining formal citizenship, and formal citizenship can affect individuals’ 
substantive citizenship in a variety of ways.  
 
A.  The Citizenship Trajectory 
 
Formal citizenship is best understood not as a static condition that equates with 
substantive citizenship but rather as a trajectory that leads toward that ideal. In other 
words, formal citizenship may lead to, facilitate, and preserve a more substantive 
citizenship. Formal citizenship might be visualized as a one-way highway with 
multiple entrances that leads toward substantive citizenship. In this analogy, 
substantive citizenship is the destination, formal citizenship is the path of travel, and 
citizenship rules provide access.132  
This imagery aptly illustrates four important points. First, in the same way that 
a single highway can have multiple entrance ramps, the citizenship path has multiple 
entry points. Though individuals on the citizenship path may travel in the same 
direction—toward substantive citizenship—they have accessed the trajectory via 
different citizenship rules. Some have entered the path through birth in the territory, 
others by naturalization, and still others through birth to citizen parents abroad. 
                                                      
membership in the state granted to the general public, . . . and it implies a certain equality 
among members.”); Robert J. Shulman, Children of a Lesser God: Should the Fourteenth 
Amendment Be Altered or Repealed to Deny Automatic Citizenship Rights and Privileges to 
American Born Children of Illegal Aliens?, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 669, 689 (1995) (“While most 
rights and privileges are enjoyed by both citizens and non-citizens within the boundaries of 
the United States, certain privileges are available only to citizens.” (citation omitted)).  
131 HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION 
AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 189 (2006) (arguing that the U.S. has drifted away 
from the concept of using immigration law as a way to facilitate integration and move 
immigrants toward substantive citizenship, and that the U.S. would benefit from returning to 
immigration laws based on this concept of “immigration as transition”). 
132 Like any analogy, this one is imperfect. One problem is that the highway analogy 
suggests that some individuals are closer to substantive citizenship than others based entirely 
on how they initially access the trajectory and that formal citizenship becomes useless once 
an individual has reached that destination. A perhaps more accurate, though certainly less 
helpful, analogy might be an asymptotic highway—one that infinitely approaches a 
destination without ever reaching it. In that case, substantive citizenship might be analogized 
to the direction of travel, rather than any specific final destination. Such a modified analogy 
preserves the value of formal citizenship and dispels the notion that an individual may be 
closer to a defined destination depending on the particular citizenship rule through which she 
accessed the highway. 
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Regardless of how individuals access the citizenship path, they are all subject to the 
same rules and enjoy the same benefits. 
Second, the citizenship path offers a set of rights and protections not available 
to noncitizens, much as a highway offers speedier travel, increased safety, and a set 
of rules that order travel on the highway so that travelers may reach their destinations 
sooner and more efficiently than those on ordinary roads. The rights and benefits of 
formal citizenship protect individuals in their development and maintenance of 
substantive citizenship. U.S. citizens, for example, may vote in federal elections and 
apply for federal means-tested welfare benefits. These rights allow citizens 
meaningful ways to further develop and maintain substantive citizenship. 
Noncitizens do not have access to these benefits. 
Third, just as individuals may travel toward a destination without traveling on 
the highway, individuals may develop substantive citizenship outside the protections 
of formal citizenship. This might be visualized as individuals traveling on parallel 
roads toward the same destination as those on the citizenship path. That is, the 
citizenship map includes many other roads and paths. Of course, individuals who 
are not on the highway lack the benefits and protections the highway offers—they 
may travel more slowly and encounter more obstructions, for example. The case of 
naturalization is illustrative. Many immigrants never naturalize. Some choose not 
to, some are not eligible, and others simply do not know how. This does not 
necessarily prevent them from developing substantive citizenship; in fact, 
individuals may develop the very same substantive citizenship that their formal 
citizen counterparts develop. 
Fourth, just as some individuals move toward a destination without entering the 
highway, others fail to move toward a destination despite being on the highway. The 
mere fact of being on a highway does not guarantee that travelers will effectively 
and speedily travel toward the destination or that travelers will move toward any 
destination at all. There may be travelers stalled on the side of the highway or even 
moving against the flow of traffic. Such individuals make travel on the highway less 
efficient and even dangerous for all travelers. The same holds true on the citizenship 
trajectory. Some individuals gain access to citizenship, but do not develop 
substantive citizenship. Some may even affirmatively avoid developing substantive 
citizenship. 
Finally, every state’s “citizenship map” will be different. The framework I 
provide here is meant to apply to many different states, regardless of their individual 
“citizenship map,” but because states have different conceptions of substantive 
citizenship, the path to substantive citizenship may be different for each state. In the 
same way that one may observe that rivers generally run downhill and toward an 
ocean without knowing the precise direction of the river or the precise location of 
the ocean, formal citizenship leads (or at least ought to lead) to substantive 
citizenship, whatever its contours. Formal citizenship rules, described below, 
provide access to that path. 
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B.  A Typology of Citizenship Rules 
 
Citizenship rules provide diverse means for accessing that trajectory—distinct 
entrances onto the highway. But not all citizenship rules are located at the same point 
along the citizenship path, nor do they provide access in exactly the same way. As 
discussed below, formal citizenship rules can play one or more of several different 
roles in relation to the citizenship highway. Citizenship rules may be descriptive, 
predictive, conscriptive, and/or prescriptive in nature. Ultimately, each type of rule 
advances the ideal of a formal citizenry composed of substantive citizens without 
requiring all formal citizens to be substantive citizens. This, in turn, takes into 
account the potential transformative power of formal citizenship. 
 
1.  Descriptive Citizenship Rules 
 
A state may confer formal citizenship on an individual who displays substantive 
citizenship. I label such citizenship rules “descriptive” because the formal status is 
meant to describe or affirm the individual’s substantive citizenship. The acquisition 
of citizenship certifies that the individual is fit for the obligations of citizenship and 
deserves the benefits of citizenship. The development of some level of substantive 
citizenship, then, is the precursor and qualifier for bestowal of formal citizenship. 
Naturalization rules may play such a descriptive role.133 Indeed, scholarship on 
naturalization sometimes treats naturalization law as a measure of the meaning of 
substantive citizenship in a state.134 The assumption is that a state does not bestow 
citizenship on an individual if that individual has not shown sufficient substantive 
citizenship or somehow proves to be a desirable citizen.135 In the United States, 
naturalization candidates must prove basic English proficiency, threshold 
knowledge of U.S. history and civics, good moral character and attachment to the 
Constitution, as well as meeting residency and physical presence requirements.136 
One might think of an individual’s fulfillment of these requirements as evidence that 
                                                      
133 See Neuman, supra note 7, at 241 (describing a “thick communitarian” model of 
naturalization in which citizenship reflects the identity of its members: “The community 
offers naturalization to those individuals who meet its criteria of identity or are making 
satisfactory progress toward that goal.”). 
134 See, e.g., SPIRO, supra note 25, at 33 (explaining that “rules relating to naturalization 
open a window on the meaning of national identity” and suggesting that “the nation’s 
aspirations are reflected in its naturalization regime”). 
135 This view of naturalization as a descriptive citizenship rule coincides with the 
bilateral liberalism that Gerald Neuman describes. See Neuman, supra note 7, at 239–40. In 
bilateral liberalism, the state’s evaluation of who is a desirable citizen interacts with the 
individual’s need and desire to be a citizen. Id. Gerald Neuman argues that although the 
“rhetoric of U.S. naturalization law fits the model of bilateral liberalism,” U.S. naturalization 
criteria more accurately fit into his conception of unilateral liberalism, which focuses on the 
individual’s need and desire to be a citizen rather than the state’s interest in determining what 
kinds of individuals should be citizens. Id. at 240. This unilateral liberalism complements 
the ideas of prescriptive citizenship below. 
136 See I.N.A. § 316, 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (2012). 
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the individual has demonstrated his substantive citizenship in the United States and 
is ready for the obligations, rights, and symbolic approval associated with 
citizenship.137 While U.S. naturalization rules indeed have a descriptive flavor,138 I 
believe (and argue later in this Article) that they are perhaps more accurately 
characterized as prescriptive in nature. 
German naturalization rules, however, provide a more striking example of 
descriptive citizenship rules. Historically, Germany’s naturalization rules employed 
citizenship as the state’s certification that the citizen had achieved ethnocultural 
assimilation139—that is, Germany’s version of substantive citizenship has 
historically been tied to ethnicity and culture.140 Until 2000, for example, Germany 
granted birthright citizenship solely on the principle of jus sanguinis, primarily 
because of the “traditional, romantic-biological, and monocultural ideology of a 
German Volk,”141 membership in which, it was argued, an individual is powerless to 
obtain or relinquish.142 Even if foreigners met this level of assimilation, 
naturalization depended on a favorable exercise of discretion, granted only where 
there was a public interest in the individual obtaining citizenship.143 A candidate had 
                                                      
137 See Lister, supra note 82, at 219 (arguing that naturalization requirements “ensure a 
commitment to the country of immigration” and “ensure assimilation into the culture of the 
country”). 
138 See, e.g., Lister, supra note 82, at 220-30. Matthew Lister rejects Pickus’ call for 
more difficult naturalization requirements in order to compel assimilation to the “national 
identity,” and accepts Carens’ view that the United States should require only a period of 
residency for naturalization, not English language proficiency or civics knowledge, 
suggesting that the current naturalization requirements are not enforced rigorously enough 
to be prescriptive. Id. (citing Joseph H. Carens, Why Naturalization Should Be Easy: A 
Response to Noah Pickus, in IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY, supra note 126, at 141, 141–46); Pickus, supra note 126, at 127–29.  
139 BRETT KLOPP, GERMAN MULTICULTURALISM: IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF CITIZENSHIP 40 (2002) (“German debates about exclusive citizenship 
versus multiculturalism are set significantly apart from similar debates elsewhere due to 
Germany’s historical legacy and its mythology of the prepolitical, natural Volk, which to this 
day colors German naturalization law . . . .”).  
140 Hartnell, supra note 125, at 373 (“Germany is typically viewed as exemplifying the 
primordialist or organicist view that belonging presupposes ethno-cultural homogeneity.”). 
141 German naturalization was limited to individuals who were integrated in the German 
way of life (Einordnung) and displayed a voluntary and lasting affiliation (Hinwendung) with 
the state. Dilek Çinar, From Aliens to Citizens: A Comparative Analysis of Rules of 
Transition 9 (Institut für Höhere Studien, Paper No. 17, 1994), 
https://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/pol/pw_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/KS9M-9ME2]; see also 
KLOPP, supra note 139, at 43–44 (cataloguing German citizenship developments, including 
the passage of Germany’s 1913 citizenship law and subsequent amendments). 
142 KLOPP, supra note 139, at 40–41. Until the 1970s, it was even difficult for a foreign 
spouse to gain citizenship independent of the German spouse. See id. at 43.  
143 Çinar, supra note 141, at 9. Ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern European 
States (Aussiedler) have “an unconditional right to German citizenship if they can prove their 
ethnic German origins.” Id. Generally, spouses of German citizens, long-term residents, and 
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to prove that she had become thoroughly and deeply German. As a result, until 
reforms in the 1990s, second- and third-generation foreigners acquired citizenship 
only after a complicated and lengthy process subject to the state’s sole discretion—
a right or entitlement to naturalization did not exist until 2000.144 For Germany, the 
purpose of “naturalization is not to foster an individual’s integration into German 
society, but rather to affirm or even consecrate integration after it has occurred.”145 
More recent reforms have loosened the requirements of naturalization, but 
naturalization in Germany remains complicated and burdensome.146 
Popular rhetoric surrounding citizenship and immigration often paints an image 
of formal citizenship serving a descriptive role. Popular terms in the citizenship and 
immigration debate include “path to citizenship” and “earned citizenship,” 
suggesting that the purpose of formal citizenship is to certify an individual’s fitness 
                                                      
young foreigners who meet all the requirements receive favorable exercises of discretion. Id. 
at 10; KLOPP, supra note 139, at 43.  
144 LYNCH & SIMON, supra note 80, at 177; see also Ciro Avitabile et al., The Effect of 
Birthright Citizenship on Parental Integration Outcomes, 56 J.L. & ECON. 777, 782–83 
(2013) (“The changes [in 1990 and 1993] introduced limited discretion of officials to deny 
naturalization and provided foreigners with the legal right to claim naturalization. . . . The 
law approved in 1999 introduced further changes to the naturalization criteria: it lowered the 
minimum residency requirement to 8 years (without age restriction) and refined the legal 
entitlement to naturalization with additional requirements such as swearing loyalty to the 
German constitution, being able to support oneself and one’s family without social security 
or unemployment benefits, a clean criminal record, and adequate command of the German 
language. Moreover, applicants had to renounce their former citizenship, to which they were 
legally entitled only if they are 18 or older.”). For an overview of the evolution of German 
naturalization law, see Marc Morjé Howard, The Causes and Consequences of Germany’s 
New Citizenship Law, 17 GERMAN POL. 41, 41–43 (2008). 
145 MOTOMURA, supra note 131, at 145–46 (describing German naturalization as 
historically meaning that “the applicant becomes German in a profound way, through 
something of a change of identity”); see Kay Hailbronner, Citizenship and Nationhood in 
Germany, in IMMIGRATION AND THE POLITICS OF CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE AND NORTH 
AMERICA 67, 79 (William Rogers Brubaker ed., 1989). 
146 Simon Green, Much Ado About Not-Very-Much? Assessing Ten Years of German 
Citizenship Reform, 16 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 173 (2012) (analyzing recent amendments to 
Germany’s citizenship policy and analyzing their relationship to declining naturalizations); 
see also Naturalization/Receiving German Citizenship, INTEGRATION IN BONN, 
http://www.integration-in-bonn.de/en/permission-of-residence/naturalization-receiving-
german-citizenship.html [https://perma.cc/S8KD-FBVM] (last visited May 8, 2016) 
(summarizing the requirements of qualifying for citizenship at birth in Germany); 
Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz [StAG] [Nationality Act], July 22, 1913, as amended, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] (Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_rustag/nationality_act.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8EB-4AYP] (providing 
an English translation of Germany’s Nationality Act, which lists the requirements for 
acquiring German citizenship). Japan has also employed very restrictive citizenship rules 
that involve stringent ethnic and cultural components. Nonethnic Japanese individuals are all 
but barred from naturalizing. See LYNCH & SIMON, supra note 80, at 189–96. 
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for inclusion in the polity.147 But citizenship rules do more than merely evaluate and 
certify fitness for citizenship. 
 
2.  Predictive Citizenship Rules 
 
Citizenship rules may also play a predictive role. A state may grant formal 
citizenship to individuals who are likely to become substantive citizens. The 
bestowal of formal citizenship now protects and facilitates the likelihood substantive 
membership later. Jus soli provides an intuitive illustration.148 An infant born within 
the state is not a substantive citizen at the time she becomes a citizen. She has no 
quality—no sense of loyalty, shared identity, or shared culture, for example—that 
would suggest she is a substantive citizen. Nonetheless, presence within the state at 
birth may suggest that the child is likely to grow up within the state boundaries, 
associate with other individuals within the state boundaries, attend school within the 
                                                      
147 For example, President Barack Obama has spoken of earned citizenship in his public 
speeches. While President Obama’s immigration policy objectives are not necessarily 
accurately or fully described in his statements regarding earned citizenship, the choice to 
discuss immigration in these terms evidences the tenor of public rhetoric:  
 
We have to deal with the 11 million individuals who are here illegally. We all 
agree that these men and women should have to earn their way to citizenship. But 
for comprehensive immigration reform to work, it must be clear from the outset 
that there is a pathway to citizenship. We’ve got to lay out a path—a process that 
includes passing a background check, paying taxes, paying a penalty, learning 
English, and then going to the back of the line, behind all the folks who are trying 
to come here legally. That’s only fair. 
 
Earned Citizenship, supra note 129. Jeb Bush, a former candidate for the 2016 Republican 
presidential nomination, has made remarkably similar comments, referring to “legal status” 
instead of “citizenship,” however:  
 
My suggestion is earned legal status. Not earned citizenship, but earned legal 
status. You don’t create a system where people cut in line in front of those who 
have been patiently waiting. But you get a provisional work permit, you work, 
you pay taxes, you pay a fine, you learn English, you don’t commit crimes, and 
you earn—over an extended period of time—legal status.  
 
Editorial, Jeb’s Smart Stand As Bush Breaks with GOP Obstruction, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 
19, 2015, 4:05 AM) (on file with the Utah Law Review), http://www.nydailynews.com/ 
opinion/editorial-jeb-smart-stands-article-1.2189539; Andrew Kaczynski, Spokesman: Jeb 
Bush Supports “Legal Status,” But Could Support Pathway to Citizenship “(Depending) on 
the Details,” BUZZFEED NEWS (May 3, 2015, 2:43 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/andrew 
kaczynski/jeb-bush-could-support-a-pathway-to-citizenship-for-undocume#.yo8L86Qzmg 
[https://perma.cc/2TRQ-2Y2A]. 
148 SPIRO, supra note 25, at 9–10 (arguing that birthright citizenship based on birth in 
the territory “ma[kes] sense in a world in which the fact of birth in U.S. territory was likely 
to coincide with actual subsequent assimilation into the American community.”). 
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state, and therefore develop a sense of identity that is tied to the state.149 Granting 
formal citizenship protects this likelihood by ensuring that the individual has access 
to rights and benefits that, in turn, help him develop substantive citizenship. 
Arguably, the U.S. version of jus sanguinis similarly distributes citizenship to 
individuals who are likely to develop substantive citizenship. Individuals who are 
born abroad to U.S. citizens may be likely to develop an affinity for the United 
States. This is particularly so where the citizen parents have spent significant time 
in the United States, as U.S. law requires for jus sanguinis to apply.150 
Naturalization can also be thought of as a predictive citizenship rule. An 
individual who meets the qualifications for naturalization, the argument might go, is 
likely to continue developing the qualities of substantive citizenship if allowed to. 
In the United States, it may be that someone who is willing to study for the 
naturalization interview, willing to learn sufficient English, and who appears at a 
ceremony that confers citizenship is likely to continue learning about her new 
country and increasingly identify with that country over time. 
This is not to say that naturalization or birthright citizenship rules necessarily 
and consistently do a good job of playing this predictive role.151 Rather, I am offering 
a set of terms that we might use to evaluate and describe citizenship rules. The 
predictive value of birth within the territory, and therefore the predictive role of 
territorial birthright citizenship rules, may depend on a variety of factors. The size 
of the state, proximity of the state to other states, the economic opportunities of the 
state relative to surrounding states, the ease of travel into and out of the state, etc., 
all bear on the predictive value of birth within the state. For example, where travel 
into and out of the state is difficult, there is a stronger likelihood that those born 
within the state will remain within the state and therefore forge the ties described 
above. Birth within a small state surrounded by multiple states that have stronger 
economies may not be predictive of a strong tie with the first state. 
 
3.  Conscriptive Citizenship Rules 
 
Conscriptive citizenship rules distribute formal citizenship without regard for 
the individual’s current or future substantive citizenship. A conscriptive citizenship 
rule is one that obligates an individual to the state for the state’s benefit despite the 
                                                      
149 Id. at 17 (“Persons born in the United States, regardless of parentage, in many cases 
could be expected to make their lives in the country, to become members of the national 
community as a matter of fact.”). 
150 For example, a child born abroad to one U.S. citizen and one noncitizen in wedlock 
is a U.S. citizen only if the U.S. citizen parent has spent five years in the United States prior 
to the birth of the child. I.N.A. § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2012). Even where both parents 
are U.S. citizens, a child born in wedlock will be a citizen only if one of the parents has had 
a residence in the United States prior to the child’s birth. I.N.A. § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401. For 
rules applying to children born out of wedlock, see I.N.A. §§ 301, 309, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(g), 
1409). 
151 See Neuman, supra note 7, at 249 (arguing that jus soli “operates too randomly to 
be understood as preserving any particular national identity”). 
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individual’s own (and potentially contrary) sense of substantive citizenship. 
Conscriptive citizenship rules differ from the other types of citizenship rules 
discussed in this Article in that instead of seeking to preserve, promote, or predict a 
sense of substantive citizenship, conscriptive citizenship rules operate in spite of and 
without reference to substantive citizenship. 
This abstract definition is admittedly hard to illustrate—how does one evaluate 
whether a citizenship rule operates contrary to individuals’ current or future 
substantive citizenship? One must look beyond the rule itself and to the rights, 
benefits, and obligations offered to citizens. There are several factors that might help 
identify a conscriptive citizenship rule or a state that employs a conscriptive 
citizenship system. Citizenship that is distributed to individuals without a possibility 
of the citizen renouncing that citizenship is likely conscriptive. Under such a 
citizenship rule, the individual has no recourse should she determine that she is not 
and does not want to become a substantive citizen of the state. But other markers are 
relevant. A lack of reciprocal obligations between citizens and sovereign suggests 
the existence of conscriptive citizenship. For example, a state that offers few if any 
rights or protections to its citizens might be said to impose conscriptive citizenship. 
Likewise, a state that unilaterally imposes significant and unwelcome obligations on 
its citizens may also be fairly described as employing conscriptive citizenship. 
The conscriptive category of citizenship rules is perhaps most relevant in a 
historical context. Some states have historically limited their citizens’ or subjects’ 
ability to renounce citizenship and have provided very limited rights to those 
citizens. China152 and the former Soviet Union153 arguably employed conscriptive 
                                                      
152 See Nationality Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 1 (Sept. 10, 1980), 
http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/ywzn/lsyw/vpna/faq/t710012.htm 
[https://perma.cc/3ZMP-5LJ2]. 
153 See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Law on Citizenship, July 1, 1979, 20 I.L.M. 
1207, art. 11 (“A child, both of whose parents at the time of its birth were citizens of the 
USSR, is a citizen of the USSR, irrespective of whether being born on the territory of the 
USSR or outside of the USSR.”). Eric Lohr describes Bolshevik citizenship policies in the 
early twentieth century as follows:  
 
Despite its attempts to attract immigrants and return migrants in 1920, in 
November of the same year the regime took a hard line on émigrés who did not 
return immediately. Decrees of November 3 and 19, 1920, ordered the 
confiscation of all land, housing, and personal possessions of individuals who had 
left the territory of the [Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic]. This 
amounted to a powerful policy against the return of émigrés and refugees, and it 
established the basic Bolshevik approach to its diaspora: return immediately or 
never. 
. . . . 
From 1926 to 1930, nearly all aspects of the citizenship boundary became 
more firm and restrictive. Immigration, emigration, naturalization, and 
denaturalization all became much more difficult. There were several motives for 
the restrictive turn—xenophobia, security-mania, ideological zeal, and an all-
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citizenship rules in the past. Both prevented their citizens from traveling abroad, 
except in controlled circumstances;154 voluntarily renouncing citizenship;155 
naturalizing in another state;156 and exercising any meaningful political rights.157  
                                                      
consuming desire to prevent the loss of hard currency, precious metals, and other 
valuables through illicit export. 
 
ERIC LOHR, RUSSIAN CITIZENSHIP: FROM EMPIRE TO SOVIET UNION 147, 171 (2012) (ebook) 
(citation omitted). 
154 LOHR, supra note 153, at 175 (“[In the 1930s, e]migration was almost completely 
banned for Soviet citizens, and for the first time in Russian history this ban was actually 
enforced. The border was sealed as never before.”); Michael L. Waddle, Physical 
Environment and Population, in CHINA: A COUNTRY STUDY 59, 83 (Robert L. Worden et al. 
eds., 4th ed. 1988) (“Through most of China’s history, strict controls prevented large 
numbers of people from leaving the country. In modern times, however, periodically some 
have been allowed to leave for various reasons.”); Thomas M. Magstadt, Emigration and 
Citizenship: Implications for Soviet-American Relations (Cato Policy Analysis, Paper No. 
70, 1980), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa070.html [https://perma.cc/9GFK-U465]. 
155 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Law on Citizenship, art.  17 (“Renunciation of 
citizenship of the USSR is sanctioned by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 
A sanction to renounce citizenship of the USSR may not be granted if the person applying 
for renunciation has unfulfilled commitments to the state or property commitments involving 
the essential interests of citizens or state, cooperative and other public organi[z]ations. 
Renunciation of citizenship of the USSR is not permitted if the person applying for 
renunciation is called to account as a defendant or there is against him a sentence of a court 
of law, which has taken legal effect and is to be enforced, or if renunciation of citizenship of 
the USSR by the person runs counter to the interests of state security of the USSR.” 
(emphases added)). 
156 Nationality Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 3 (“The People’s Republic 
of China does not recognize dual nationality for any Chinese national.”); id. art. 9 (“Any 
Chinese national who has settled abroad and who has been naturalized as a foreign national 
or has acquired foreign nationality of his own free will shall automatically lose Chinese 
nationality.”); Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Law on Citizenship, art. 8 (“No person, 
being a USSR citizen, shall be recogni[z]ed as having a foreign nationality.”); LOHR, supra 
note 153, at 176 (“In case after case regarding people who had the chance to opt for other 
citizenships but had not done so by the established deadline, the government upheld their 
ascribed status as Soviet citizens (even if they had no documents and had not undergone any 
formal ceremony, and even if another state claimed them to be eligible for their citizenship). 
Only after a lengthy and by no means automatic appeals process could these individuals be 
released from Soviet citizenship and allowed to leave the country.”). 
157 LOHR, supra note 153, at 151 (“The great denaturalization of Russians abroad fits 
into the broader context of the Soviet approach to domestic citizenship, which included a 
peculiar variant of partial denaturalization that involved deprivation of the rights of 
citizenship while retaining the obligations and status of citizen.”); Freedom in the World 
Country Ratings: 1972–2014, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/ 
Individual%20Country%20Ratings%20and%20Status%2C%201973-2015%20%28FINAL 
%29.xls [https://perma.cc/ALL8-C2CZ] (last visited May 9, 2016) (giving the Soviet Union 
and communist China consistently low political rights and civil liberties scores). 
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In many ways, the concept of conscriptive citizenship lines up with many 
commentators’ understanding of “ascriptive citizenship.”158 I decline to use that term 
here, however, for two reasons. First, the term “ascriptive citizenship” suffers from 
ambiguity in the citizenship literature. Second, some commentators have used the 
term “ascriptive citizenship” to challenge territorial birthright citizenship rules. 
While my use of “conscriptive citizenship” aligns well with those commentators’ 
general descriptions of “ascriptive citizenship,” I disagree that jus soli constitutes an 
ascriptive—or (in my framework) conscriptive—citizenship rule.  
The term “ascriptive citizenship” is well established in legal commentaries on 
citizenship, thanks in large part to Peter Schuck and Rogers Smith’s detailed 
treatment of the concept in Citizenship Without Consent: Illegal Aliens in the 
American Polity.159 The term, however, suffers from ambiguity. Some use the term 
“ascriptive” to refer to citizenship rules that automatically distribute citizenship to 
individuals based on some objectively identifiable criteria.160 Under this conception 
of ascriptive citizenship, all birthright citizenship rules are ascriptive because they 
work automatically at birth based on the circumstances of birth. Often, however, the 
term “ascriptive” carries a connotation of unfairness and arbitrariness.161 Two 
varieties of this more negative version of “ascriptive citizenship” exist. Some 
discussions of a negative version of ascriptive citizenship focus on unfairness to the 
state: by automatically conferring citizenship on individuals, the state loses its ability 
to consent to each citizen’s inclusion in the polity.162 Others focus on the unfairness 
                                                      
158 In fact, it is only because “ascriptive citizenship” occupies such an important place 
in citizenship scholarship that I include conscriptive citizenship at all. Because conscriptive 
citizenship describes so few citizenship rules, it is not as helpful as the other categories I 
have created. But it is important to contextualize those categories in the literature about 
ascriptive citizenship, which I distinguish from conscriptive citizenship, particularly because 
many commentators have described territorial birthright citizenship, a topic featured in Part 
V of this Article, in their discussions of ascriptive citizenship. 
159 SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 15. 
160 See, e.g., RUTH RUBIO-MARÍN, IMMIGRATION AS A DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE: 
CITIZENSHIP AND INCLUSION IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 8 (2000) (proposing a 
system of European citizenship in which “permanent residents could be ‘automatically’ 
granted citizenship—that is, citizenship could be ascribed to all residents after a certain 
number of years, even to those who would not choose to opt for naturalization under a 
voluntary naturalization approach”); see also Jo Shaw, E.U. Citizenship and Political Rights 
in an Evolving European Union, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2549, 2563 (2007) (recognizing that 
there is “nothing like a system of automatic or ascriptive citizenship acquisition for resident 
non-nationals . . . in the E.U. Member States”).  
161 Matthew Lister has highlighted the unwarranted connotation the term has developed. 
Lister, supra note 82, at 216 (“[I]t is important to see that a jus soli rule need not have the 
negative ‘ascriptive’ aspects attributed to it by Shuck, Cohen, Smith, and others. Such a 
contention confuses historical fact with conceptual necessity.”); see SCHUCK & SMITH, supra 
note 10, at 9–22. 
162 See, e.g., SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 20–21; Elizabeth F. Cohen, Carved 
from the Inside Out: Immigration and America’s Public Philosophy on Citizenship, in 
DEBATING IMMIGRATION 32, 41 (Carol M. Swain ed., 2007) (arguing that jus soli is a form 
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to citizens: the automatic bestowal of citizenship on an individual imposes 
citizenship on the individual without her consent.163 
This more negative understanding of ascriptive citizenship has roots in modern 
academic debates about the U.S. practice of distributing citizenship to the U.S.-born 
children of undocumented immigrants. Elizabeth Cohen, Peter Schuck, Rogers 
Smith, and others have used the term to argue that jus soli is an illegitimate basis for 
distributing citizenship in the United States.164 They argue that the distribution of 
citizenship based on birth within state territory—jus soli—is rooted in antiquated 
notions of citizenship and therefore foreign to the consensualist underpinnings of 
the U.S. Constitution.165 For Schuck and Smith, the most problematic aspect is the 
lack of consent on the part of the citizen, though they also refer to the state’s lack of 
consent.166 Elizabeth Cohen’s primary objection to birthright territorial citizenship 
is the state’s lack of consent.167 Others have persuasively challenged these arguments 
                                                      
of ascriptive citizenship that “deprives both the community and the individual [gaining 
citizenship] of the opportunity to come to reasoned conclusions about membership”).  
163 See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 20–21; Cohen, supra note 162, at 41. 
164 See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 116–17; Cohen, supra note 162, at 40–45. 
165 SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, 116–18; Cohen, supra note 162, at 40–45; Stevens, 
supra note 116, at 340–45.  
166 Schuck and Smith trace the history of ascriptive citizenship to medieval notions of 
“natural” allegiance. SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 15. An infant born within the 
sovereign’s territory, whose birth there resulted from divine will, owed a “debt of allegiance 
due in return for protection received.” Id. at 15–16. The subject “owed complete obedience 
and service; the sovereign owed physical protection and just governance.” Id. at 17. This 
relationship was irrevocable and perpetual. Id. In practice, however, irrevocability was more 
binding on the subject. See id. The sovereign’s failure to protect the subject did not release 
the subject from his obligation of allegiance, but the subject’s failure to render allegiance 
was grounds for banishment or worse. See id. In order to keep individuals from freely 
absolving themselves of their debt of fealty, ascriptive citizenship includes not only a 
nonconsensual entry strategy to citizenship (birth) but also a nonexistent or severely limited 
exit strategy to citizenship. See id. Thus, based on Schuck and Smith’s historical account, 
the hallmark of ascriptive citizenship is lack of consent on the part of the citizen and an 
inability to terminate her relationship with the state.  
Schuck and Smith argue that jus soli is a form of ascriptive citizenship because it (1) 
imposes citizenship on individuals who have not consented to citizenship and to whom the 
state has not consented (2) based on the accidental circumstance of birth within the territory. 
See id at 13–17. Such a system, the argument goes, runs counter to the consensualist notions 
of citizenship that underlie the U.S. Constitution. See id. at 116–17. Jus sanguinis—
citizenship based on birth to a citizen parent—they argue, is a more appropriate and consent-
based form of citizenship. See id. Schuck and Smith propose a reinterpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that does not require the distribution of citizenship to the children of 
undocumented immigrants. See id. 
167 Cohen argues that the commonly understood foundations of jus soli do not actually 
support its modern application. Cohen, supra note 162, at 44–45. She emphasizes the 
circumstances surrounding Calvin’s Case—which is commonly cited as the origin of 
American jus soli. Id. at 40–45. In Calvin’s Case, she argues, “it was borders rather than 
people doing the migrating” in that it “resolved the political status of people who had been 
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against birthright citizenship, and I do not undertake a direct response to these 
arguments here.168 I do, however, comment on territorial birthright citizenship in 
Part V of this paper using the framework developed in this Part. Because my 
arguments about jus soli are at odds with those of Schuck, Smith, and Cohen, I 
choose to use a new term, “conscriptive citizenship,” to refer to the types of 
citizenship rules that they might label “ascriptive.”  
 
4.  Prescriptive Citizenship 
 
Significantly neglected in contemporary public rhetoric about immigration and 
citizenship is the prescriptive role of citizenship. Formal citizenship can prescribe 
substantive citizenship: that is, formal citizenship can provide an individual the 
rights, benefits, and opportunities that will nudge the individual toward the 
development of substantive citizenship.169 In effect, formal citizenship can be a 
mechanism for integrating and incorporating otherwise marginalized individuals and 
groups into mainstream society. Formal citizenship can remove many of the 
obstacles and challenges to integration and development of substantive membership 
that such marginalized individuals and groups face. 
The concept of prescriptive citizenship can be slightly harder to define and 
distinguish from the other categories described in this Article. At first blush, 
prescriptive citizenship might sound like conscriptive citizenship in that the state 
uses a formal citizenship rule to achieve its own purpose. However, there are 
important differences. In conscriptive citizenship, the state assigns formal 
citizenship for the state’s own benefit without regard for the individual’s substantive 
citizenship. In prescriptive citizenship, the state desires to integrate the individual 
receiving citizenship and paves the path for the individual’s development of 
                                                      
born in Scotland after the ascent of a Scot, King James, to the British throne.” Id. at 41. But 
modern citizenship rules are more related to the dynamics of immigration across sovereign 
borders. Id. As such, modern rules must take into account more fundamental questions of 
“Who do we want to be?” Id. at 45.  
168 I agree with commentators who have argued that the conclusions of Shuck and 
Smith, as well as others who subscribe to their understanding of ascriptive citizenship, are 
undermined by their own argument. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda, Race, Citizenship, and the 
Search for Political Community Among ‘We the People,’ 76 OR. L. REV. 233, 238–42 (1997). 
After all, their preferred citizenship rule, jus sanguinis, is subject to the very same critique 
they use to challenge jus soli. Jus sanguinis imposes citizenship on an infant that has not 
consented to citizenship based on something entirely outside of the child’s control. SCHUCK 
& SMITH, supra note 10, at 117–18. Consent plays no real role. Moreover, Schuck and Smith 
fail to account for the fact that most states’ versions of jus soli allow a citizen to terminate 
citizenship at will. The right to subsequently reject citizenship might fairly be characterized 
to represent consent to that citizenship. The absence of irrevocability in most modern 
applications of jus soli weighs against labeling jus soli as categorically ascriptive in nature. 
169 See MOTOMURA, supra note 131, at 189; Safran, supra note 79, at 314 (identifying 
the bestowal of citizenship as a historical means to integrate immigrants into the political 
community). 
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substantive citizenship.170 The goal of prescriptive citizenship is that the individual’s 
substantive citizenship will align with the individual’s formal citizenship. The goals 
of conscriptive citizenship are unrelated to the individual’s substantive membership. 
A state that employs prescriptive citizenship rules offers protections, rights, and 
benefits to individuals in order to foster the development of substantive citizenship. 
A state that employs conscriptive citizenship rules may disproportionately impose 
burdens without corresponding protections. 
Prescriptive citizenship can also seem to overlap with predictive citizenship. 
After all, if a prescriptive citizenship rule is effective, it will consistently and 
predictably produce the desired result—individual citizens’ development of 
substantive citizenship. One can predict the individual’s development of substantive 
citizenship by virtue of the conferral of formal citizenship. This is indeed the ideal 
result of a prescriptive citizenship rule, but the rationales for prescriptive and 
predictive citizenship rules are different. A state employs a prescriptive citizenship 
rule in order to catalyze the development of substantive citizenship in individuals 
who otherwise might not have developed substantive citizenship. A state employs a 
predictive citizenship rule to merely sanction what it already expects will happen. In 
both instances, the effect is the same—formal citizenship protects and fosters the 
development of substantive citizenship—but the rationale is different. This 
difference in rationale is important because it affects the ultimate contours of a 
citizenship rule. If the state focuses on predictive citizenship, it may enact formal 
citizenship rules that confer citizenship on individuals it views as mainstream 
members of society. If the state focuses on prescriptive citizenship, it may extend 
citizenship to marginalized individuals who could use the protections of formal 
citizenship in developing substantive citizenship and ultimately integrating into 
mainstream society. 
The concept of prescriptive citizenship recognizes the transformative power of 
formal citizenship—formal citizenship can help individuals move toward 
substantive citizenship. Hiroshi Motomura’s concept of “immigration as transition” 
leads naturally to the notion of prescriptive citizenship. In Americans in Waiting, 
Motomura proposes treating new immigrants like citizens to give “lawful 
immigrants the best chance to belong in America, in a broad sense that goes beyond 
                                                      
170 The precise mechanisms by which formal citizenship can help an individual develop 
substantive citizenship (and the effectiveness of that relationship) depend entirely on the 
state’s understanding of substantive citizenship, the particular rules by which it grants formal 
citizenship, and the rights and benefits associated with citizenship. Again, I do not undertake 
an examination of the contours of substantive citizenship in the United States or anywhere 
else, and I make no normative judgments about particular views of substantive citizenship in 
this Article. Rather, I propose that formal citizenship can affect substantive citizenship in a 
variety of ways, depending on the content of that substantive citizenship. The state may have 
various reasons for prescribing membership. The state may recognize that, absent a grant of 
formal citizenship, certain classes of individuals may become an underclass. The state may 
also wish to facilitate the development of substantive citizenship in individuals who have 
expressed an independent desire to do so. Other reasons may exist. 
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formal citizenship to include integration into American society.”171 In essence, 
Motomura advocates extending many rights172 currently available only to citizens to 
new immigrants to foster “a fuller sense of belonging through family, education, and 
economic opportunity.”173 As Motomura recognizes, however, this transition does 
not end with the acquisition of formal citizenship through naturalization. To the 
contrary, naturalization is itself part of the integration process: it “is neither a start 
nor an end point, but an important milestone along the way.”174 
U.S. citizenship acquired through naturalization indeed provides the most 
intuitive case of prescriptive citizenship. Though naturalization imposes 
requirements on candidates, they are less burdensome than in many other states.175 
Naturalization requirements do not restrict formal citizenship to only those 
individuals whose identities are inextricably tied to the state or who have fully 
integrated into society. That is, naturalization requirements do not necessarily ensure 
that those who naturalize are substantive citizens. But this is not a failing of 
naturalization. Rather, naturalization can be seen as a tool of transition for the 
individual applicant; naturalization fosters greater commitment to and membership 
in society.176 In fact, the process itself—the study of U.S. history and civics, the 
                                                      
171 MOTOMURA, supra note 131, at 189.  
172 Id. at 190–97 (advocating for immigrant welfare benefits, voting rights, the right to 
serve in public office or public employment, and protection against deportation). 
173 Id. at 162. 
174 Id. at 164. 
175 See id. at 145–47 (comparing the approaches of German immigration law, which 
“consecrates” integration that has already occurred, with American immigration law); see 
also RAINER BAUBÖCK ET AL., EUROPEAN UNIV. INST., ACCESS TO CITIZENSHIP AND ITS 
IMPACT ON IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION: EUROPEAN SUMMARY AND STANDARDS 2–21 (2013), 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/images/acit/acit_report_eu%20level%20summary.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RN98-B7P2] (providing a statistical analysis comparing the naturalization 
requirements within Europe); BRONWEN MANBY, OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS., CITIZENSHIP LAW 
IN AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 64–72 (2d ed. 2010), 
http://www.unhcr.org/4cbc60ce6.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG36-9GXW] (charting the 
difficulty of obtaining citizenship in many African nations). 
176 See MOTOMURA, supra note 131, at 189–200. Compare this view of naturalization 
to that of Noah Pickus, who argues that current naturalization procedures do not adequately 
“generate[] a sense of mutual commitment among all Americans, naturalized and native-born 
alike.” Pickus, supra note 126, at 108. He suggests that U.S. naturalization should be more 
substantive and symbolic. Id. at 126. To put his arguments in terms of the framework 
provided in this Article, Pickus takes a particular view of substantive citizenship in the 
United States and argues that naturalization should be descriptive with respect to that view 
of substantive citizenship. Id. Joseph Carens, on the other hand, proposes that a minimum 
residency requirement is the only defensible requirement for naturalization. Carens, supra 
note 138, at 142. His approach takes a more prescriptive view of naturalization in that he 
distinguishes between the requirements of naturalization and the aspirations for naturalized 
citizens. Id. at 142–46 (“What about loyalty, patriotism, and identity? Can’t we expect 
immigrants to become attached to America? . . . [A]s a normative matter, we should not try 
to impose such an expectation, much less make it a legal requirement. This is the sort of thing 
we can try to encourage and foster, but it’s not the sort of thing we should try to command.”). 
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efforts to become sufficiently proficient in English, the citizenship ceremony—
promotes substantive citizenship even if only alerting new citizens to concepts, 
processes, and history that are widely believed to be important and fundamental to 
substantive citizenship in the United States.177 
Perhaps less obvious is how formal citizenship can play a prescriptive role even 
outside the realm of naturalization. Jus soli plays a prescriptive role in U.S. 
citizenship law, both on an individual level and on a group basis. For an individual, 
birthright citizenship secures the full suite of rights and benefits available in the 
state. This arguably maximizes the individual’s opportunity to develop substantive 
citizenship and a sense of belonging in the community that, in turn, prepares the 
individual for assuming the obligations of citizenship.178 Citizenship shapes an 
individual’s sense of identity, loyalty, sense of place, and sense of belonging.179 This 
is particularly important for first-generation U.S. citizens, but remains true for 
children descended from a long line of citizens. 
The prescriptive role of jus soli also plays out in the aggregate: the distribution 
of formal citizenship to individual children born in the United States fosters the 
integration of whole communities over time. The conferral of citizenship on a single 
                                                      
Carens, however, does not adequately account for the capacity to foster substantive 
citizenship inherent in formal citizenship itself.  
177 MOTOMURA, supra note 131, at 156–57 (urging the use of the “civics and history 
requirements to educate rather than purely to test”). 
178 GERISON LANSDOWN, UNICEF, THE EVOLVING CAPACITIES OF THE CHILD 17 
(2005), http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/evolving-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/7V 
6W-4Z7U] (asserting that individuals, including children, “build competence and confidence 
through direct experience: Participation leads to greater levels of confidence, which in turn 
enhances the quality of participation”). 
179 See, e.g., Bhabha, supra note 14, at 58 (“As the child develops, so the balance 
between ascriptive status and consensual identification shifts—the child changes from a 
repository of protective concerns, a recipient of enabling inputs to an active 
participant . . . .”); Caroline B. Brettell, Political Belonging and Cultural Belonging: 
Immigration Status, Citizenship, and Identity Among Four Immigrant Populations in a 
Southwestern City, 50 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 70, 70 (2006); Kelly Campbell et al., 
Exploring the Latino Paradox: How Economic and Citizenship Status Impact Health, 34 
HISP. J. BEHAV. SCI. 187, 188 (2012); Ariana Mangual Figueroa, “I Have Papers So I Can 
Go Anywhere!”: Everyday Talk About Citizenship in a Mixed-Status Mexican Family, 11 J. 
LANGUAGE, IDENTITY, & EDUC. 291, 291 (2012) (“The findings show that siblings 
communicate two key understandings during everyday conversations: first, the relevance of 
migratory status to their day-to-day lives and second, their family’s shared conventions for 
talking about citizenship in the home. As children and youth demonstrate the social norms 
for talking about citizenship, they also express their understanding of the ways that being a 
United States or Mexican citizen shapes their future opportunities.”); Roger Geertz 
Gonzalez, Same and Different: Latino College Students’ Perceptions of Themselves and 
Others on Campus, 12 J. HISP. HIGHER EDUC. 3, 17 (2013) (“[M]ost Latino college students 
point to a political power hierarchy between the three groups based on country of origin: 
Puerto Ricans who are natural born citizens, Cuban Americans who can stay and become 
U.S. citizens based on the wet foot/dry foot policy, and Mexicans who have a harder time 
acquiring citizenship when they enter the United States.”).  
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individual can foster the development of substantive citizenship in that individual’s 
parents, children, and grandchildren.180 As the individual with formal citizenship 
enjoys the advantages of formal citizenship, she becomes an usher in her family’s 
navigation of culture, language, government, politics, and more.181 In that sense, the 
development of substantive citizenship “can be a multigenerational process.”182 The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Wong Kim Ark183 triggered just such an aggregate 
effect. There, the U.S.-born child of Chinese immigrants claimed that he was a U.S. 
citizen by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.184 Though the United States did not 
provide for the naturalization of any Chinese immigrants and did not allow Chinese 
immigration at the time, the Court found that the claimant fell within the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s citizenship clause.185 As a result, the operation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment played an important role in placing Chinese communities on a 
trajectory toward substantive citizenship in American society.186 I contextualize the 
prescriptive role of jus soli in the larger debate about birthright citizenship in more 
detail in Part V. 
 
V.  NAVIGATING MODERN IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP DEBATES 
 
A more nuanced understanding of the roles that formal citizenship can play 
with respect to substantive citizenship alleviates the apparent paradox created by 
multiple paths to formal citizenship. Citizenship is much more than a stamp of 
approval indicating an individual’s fitness for membership in the community, 
though it can sometimes play just such a descriptive role. Citizenship is not a 
destination, but rather a path to integration and belonging—substantive citizenship. 
The fact that individuals who become citizens through naturalization, jus soli, and 
                                                      
180 See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 180–81 (2014) 
(describing the way in which the conferral of legal residence and citizenship status on 
children helps children “serve as cultural brokers between their parents and mainstream 
society” despite their parents’ language barriers and immigration status). 
181 See id. 
182 See MOTOMURA, supra note 131, at 146–47 (“Jus soli reflects transition for families, 
by assuring first-generation immigrant parents that their children born in the United States 
will be citizens. Historically, this was especially important for Asian immigrants, who were 
barred from naturalization, but whose U.S.-born children became citizens under the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 1898 decision in Wong Kim Ark. More fundamentally, jus soli recognizes 
that transition can be a multigenerational process.”); see also MOTOMURA, supra note 180, 
at 168–69 (discussing the relationship between local integration and national citizenship as 
“mutually reinforcing”). In addition, the Fourteenth Amendment plays a more fundamental 
anti-caste function that is most apparent in the citizenship rights associated with African 
Americans. See Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 
90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011); Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor 
Balkin’s Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 669–70 (2009). 
183 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
184 Id. at 649. 
185 Id. at 702–05. 
186 See MOTOMURA, supra note 131, at 146–47. 
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jus sanguinis are not equally qualified at the moment of citizenship is not a failing 
of citizenship law but an important feature that accounts for formal citizenship’s 
ability to preserve and facilitate substantive citizenship. 
Under the framework proposed here, political and academic debates regarding 
citizenship and immigration can best be understood as arising from (1) disagreement 
about which role formal citizenship should play with respect to substantive 
citizenship or (2) whether a formal citizenship rule has or will successfully affect 
substantive citizenship in the desired or expected way. Should birthright citizenship 
be predictive in nature? Is it adequately fulfilling this role? What role should 
naturalization play? Is it descriptive? If so, do naturalization requirements 
adequately measure an individual’s substantive citizenship? 
This dynamic is evident in many areas, but here I briefly discuss how my 
framework helps spotlight the underlying tensions in two examples: (A) the 
recurring proposals to exclude the children of undocumented immigrants from 
access to territorial birthright citizenship and (B) the debate surrounding the 
proposal and ultimate failure of the DREAM Act provide useful discussion 
platforms. 
 
A.  Jus Soli and the U.S.-born Children of Undocumented Immigrants 
 
U.S. law has historically operated (and continues to operate) on the premise 
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of citizenship to all individuals 
“born . . . in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof”187 included all 
but the children of diplomats and “Indians not taxed.”188 In its landmark decision of 
Wong Kim Ark, the Supreme Court held as much in concluding that the U.S.-born 
son of Chinese immigrants (who themselves were legally barred from naturalizing 
on account of their race) was a U.S. citizen.189 The publication, however, of Schuck 
and Smith’s Citizenship Without Consent, which argued that the children of 
undocumented immigrants are outside of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee,190 
sparked a long-term debate about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
citizenship clause. Several scholars have challenged Schuck and Smiths’ conclusion 
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not mandate the distribution of citizenship to 
the U.S.-born children of undocumented immigrants,191 but others have adopted 
                                                      
187 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
188 See Epps, supra note 89, at 352 (describing the two classes not subject to “the full 
and complete jurisdiction” of the United States: children of diplomats and Indians not taxed). 
189 Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 705. 
190 SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10, at 114–15. 
191 See, e.g., Epps, supra note 89, at 334–35; Gotanda, supra note 168, at 237–38; Allen 
R. Kamp, The Birthright Citizenship Controversy: A Study of Conservative Substance and 
Rhetoric, 18 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 49, 59 (2012); Gerard N. Magliocca, Indians and 
Invaders: The Citizenship Clause and Illegal Aliens, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 499, 501 (2008); 
David A. Martin, Membership and Consent: Abstract or Organic?, 11 YALE J. INT’L L. 278, 
279 (1985) (reviewing SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10); Gerald L. Neuman, Back to Dred 
Scott?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 485, 486 (1987) (reviewing SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10); 
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their views.192 Legislators periodically attempt to limit the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
citizenship clause’s application,193 but all have failed. A recent surge in debate about 
the birthright citizenship based on birth in U.S. territory194 suggests that this will be 
a recurring topic of public interest. 
The existing debate can be better understood within the citizenship framework 
proposed in this Article. Many critics of territorial birthright citizenship argue that 
the United States cannot financially support a citizenry that is increasing through 
birthright citizenship.195 Because there are simply not enough jobs or tax dollars to 
go around, the state must make distinctions among individuals born in the United 
States. Others are more specific; they argue that the children of undocumented 
immigrants are not and are unlikely to become like other U.S.-born children despite 
being born in the same country.196 The children of undocumented immigrants, the 
                                                      
David S. Schwartz, The Amorality of Consent, 74 CAL. L. REV. 2143, 2143 (1986) (reviewing 
SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10); Janet Wong, Book Review, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
746, 748 (1986) (reviewing SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 10). These articles argue against 
Schuck and Smith’s position that a person born of illegal immigrants should not be a citizen 
within Fourteenth Amendment protection.  
192 See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Birthright Citizenship for Children of Illegal Aliens: An 
Irrational Public Policy, 14 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 3 (2009); William Ty Mayton, Birthright 
Citizenship and the Civic Minimum, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 221, 227 (2008); Wood, supra 
note 118, at 494-95; Stevens, supra note 116, at 344–45. These articles advocate for a change 
in American birthright citizenship similar to the Schuck and Smith position.  
193 See, e.g., Birthright Citizenship Act of 2013, H.R. 140, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013); 
Birthright Citizenship Act of 2011, S. 723, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); Birthright Citizenship 
Act of 2009, H.R. 1868, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009); H.R. 126, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009); 
Citizenship Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 133, 110th Cong. §§ 2, 3 (2007). These bills have 
varied, but they generally reinterpret the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause to 
require citizenship only for children born to U.S. citizens, legal permanent residents, or aliens 
serving in the armed forces. Other proposals to deny birthright citizenship to the children of 
undocumented immigrants, however, concede that the Fourteenth Amendment may indeed 
provide for birthright citizenship to all children born in the United States and, therefore, they 
call for an amendment to the Constitution. See S.J. Res. 2, 112th Cong. (2011).  
194 For example, 2016 Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump has expressed 
doubts that the U.S. Constitution requires the bestowal of citizenship to the children of 
undocumented immigrants. Nick Gass, Trump to O’Reilly: The 14th Amendment Is 
Unconstitutional, POLITICO (Aug. 19, 2015, 6:38 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/ 
08/donald-trump-bill-oreilly-interview-121515.html?ml=po [https://perma.cc/3CHJ-6Y27]. 
195 Ian Tuttle, The Very Real Economic Costs of Birthright Citizenship, NAT’L REV. 
(Aug. 21, 2015, 6:40 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/422921/birthright-
citizenship-economic-costs-incentives [https://perma.cc/DW4P-ZYXM].  
196 See, e.g., Wood, supra note 118, at 495-96 (“[B]ecause the parents are illegal, and 
hence to some degree fearful of apprehension and deportation, their children are less likely 
to participate in the wider community, to learn English, and otherwise to assimilate fully. As 
a result, U.S.-born children of illegal aliens seem less likely to become fully Americanized 
than the children of citizens or legal immigrants. To the extent they are not fully 
Americanized before they reach voting age, their votes are less likely to be based on 
traditional American values and concerns, and therefore more likely to favor policies 
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argument goes, will not speak English, will not have sufficiently strong ties and 
loyalty to the United States, will not engage in the U.S. political culture, or will 
otherwise fail to ever become attached to the United States in a meaningful way.197 
Essentially, these arguments presume that the purpose of birthright citizenship is to 
identify individuals who are already like other citizens or who will become like other 
citizens—that territorial birthright citizenship is predictive or descriptive in nature. 
Under these arguments, territorial birthright citizenship is failing in its descriptive 
or predictive role. 
Generally, opponents respond to these arguments in kind. The U.S.-born 
children of undocumented immigrants, they argue, are very much like their 
counterparts with documented parents.198 They will go to school in the United States, 
they will learn English, they will have more ties to the United States than to any 
other country, they will be as informed about political debates as any other child 
born in the United States, and they will consider themselves American.199 These 
supporters of current U.S. citizenship practice conclude that birthright citizenship 
succeeds in its descriptive and predictive role.200 
Arguments on both sides are flawed and incomplete. First, it is nonsensical to 
think of birthright citizenship as having any descriptive role. Infants born in the 
United States cannot be said to be substantive citizens from the moment of 
citizenship—birth. Infants have no real ties, no loyalty, no sense of shared identity, 
no understanding of the surrounding culture, or any other factor that could 
legitimately measure substantive citizenship in the United States. All infants are 
indistinguishable with respect to substantive citizenship. Any discussions about 
                                                      
opposed by most Americans. Less rapid or complete Americanization also frequently results 
in greater ethnic tensions and other problems associated with the growing multiculturalism 
in our country.” (citation omitted)).  
197 See id.  
198 See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Making Legal: The DREAM Act, Birthright 
Citizenship, and Broad-Scale Legalization, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1127, 1136-37 
(2012); D. Carolina Núñez, Beyond Blood and Borders: Finding Meaning in Birthright 
Citizenship, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 835, 875-80 (2013).  
199 The debate surrounding the DREAM Act illustrates these assertions as well. 
President Barack Obama has described undocumented immigrant children brought to the 
United States at a young age: “These are young people who study in our schools, they play 
in our neighborhoods, they’re friends with our kids, they pledge allegiance to our flag. They 
are Americans in their heart, in their minds, in every single way but one: on paper.” Press 
Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, White House, Remarks by the President on Immigration 
(June 15, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-
president-immigration [https://perma.cc/57DB-62PD]; see also Jose Antonio Vargas, 
Shadow Americans, TIME, June 25, 2012, at 34, 36–43 (discussing personal experiences with 
immigrant misperceptions). If these DREAMers, brought to the country at a young age, have 
acquired substantive citizenship even without formal citizenship, it is illogical to think that 
similarly situated children born in the United States would not develop substantive 
citizenship, particularly with the protections that formal citizenship provides.  
200 See Núñez, supra note 198, at 878.  
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whether the children of undocumented immigrants—or infants generally—
somehow “deserve” birthright citizenship are fatally flawed. 
To the extent that arguments focus on the predictive role of territorial birthright 
citizenship, those arguments are incomplete. Certainly, birthright citizenship has a 
predictive role. It is not a stretch to argue that the distribution of citizenship to 
individuals born in the United States identifies individuals who are likely to become 
like the rest of the citizenry in some substantive way. After all, they are likely to 
reside in the U.S., attend public school, and engage in activities that incorporate 
them into their surrounding communities. Thus, the arguments about whether the 
children of undocumented immigrants will become like other citizens are inherently 
arguments about whether birthright territorial citizenship as currently understood in 
the United States adequately predicts substantive citizenship. While I agree with 
those who argue that the children of undocumented immigrants are very much like 
their counterparts born to parents who are citizens or documented immigrants,201 
these arguments fail to account for a potentially more important role that territorial 
birthright citizenship plays. 
As proposed in Part IV above, territorial birthright citizenship has a strong 
prescriptive component, and the failure to account for the transformative role of 
formal citizenship renders the current debates on birthright citizenship incomplete. 
The distribution of citizenship to individuals at birth can place those individuals on 
a path toward substantive citizenship. As citizens exercise their citizenship rights, 
they develop the characteristics of substantive citizenship, including shared identity, 
loyalty, civic-mindedness, or any other trait that is important to substantive 
citizenship in the United States. In fact, that is arguably precisely what the 
Fourteenth Amendment accomplished for the Americans who had previously been 
excluded from citizenship by slavery.202  
                                                      
201 Id. at 875–80. 
202 See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702–05 (1898) (holding an 
American-born child of Chinese immigrants had citizen rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 454 (1857) (denying U.S. 
citizen rights to a slave), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 
Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Slavery, Free Blacks and Citizenship, 43 RUTGERS L.J. 487, 505 
(2013) (“The Fourteenth Amendment . . . granted citizenship to all native-born black 
Americans, making African American citizenship a part of the Constitution.”); Robert E. 
Mensel, Jurisdiction in Nineteenth Century International Law and Its Meaning in the 
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 329, 354 
(2013) (noting that U.S. citizenship concerns for former slaves after the Civil War culminated 
in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration 
Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2071 (2008) (explaining that the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments helped with the integration of immigrants); Mae M. Ngai, 
Birthright Citizenship and the Alien Citizen, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2521, 2528 (2007) (“For 
the freed slaves, . . . access to territorial birthright citizenship has been a measure of progress 
against racial inequality and subordination. [They] have recognized that citizenship is the 
most elemental condition for racial equality because only citizenship guarantees the right to 
be territorially present and the right to vote; in other words, it is the individual’s foundational 
protection from state authority. The Fourteenth Amendment aimed precisely to accomplish 
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The question, then, ought to be not only whether a territorial birthright 
citizenship rule accurately predicts who will become a substantive citizen, but also 
whether a territorial birthright citizenship rule properly identifies individuals that the 
United States wants to place on the path to substantive citizenship.203 Reframing the 
question in this way helps ground the varying scenarios that have raised questions 
about the legitimacy of current U.S. territorial birthright citizenship practice in 
appropriate language.  
For example, some who challenge the current application of U.S. territorial 
birthright citizenship point to evidence of noncitizen women entering the United 
States as tourists to give birth and thereby secure U.S. citizenship for their children. 
In a spirited critique of U.S. jus soli as currently applied, John McCaslin of the 
Washington Times referenced a “huge and growing industry in Asia that arranges 
tourist visas for pregnant women so they can fly to the United States and give birth 
to an American. Obviously, this was not the intent of the 14th Amendment; it makes 
a mockery of citizenship.”204 Judge Richard Posner later quoted McCaslin in his own 
vigorous objection to the current U.S. citizenship practice.205 There are legitimate 
questions about whether extending birthright citizenship to the children of tourists 
temporarily in the United States adequately and effectively serves a predictive or 
prescriptive function. Are the children of tourists likely to develop substantive U.S. 
citizenship? Are the children of tourists part of a class of individuals we ought to 
place on the citizenship path to encourage their development of substantive 
citizenship?  
Whatever the answer to those questions,206 there is no reason to extrapolate 
those answers to the children of undocumented immigrants. Even if formal 
                                                      
that basic condition, to nullify Dred Scott’s exclusion of black people from citizenship.”); 
Núñez, supra note 198, at 872–74 (discussing the grant of citizenship to American Indians 
after the Fourteenth Amendment); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. 
REV. 2410, 2435 (1994) (quoting one senator’s explanation of the purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment at the time of passing as an attempt to “abolish[ ] all class legislation in the 
States and [do] away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not 
applicable to another” (alterations in original) (citation omitted)).  
203 Reframing the question in this way helps sift through the varying scenarios that have 
raised questions about the birthright citizenship rule.  
204 Inside the Beltway, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2002), http://www.washingtontimes. 
com/news/2002/aug/27/20020827-041504-7305r/ [https://perma.cc/3SVZ-4NYY] (quoting 
Craig Nelson, director of Friends of Immigration Law Enforcement).  
205 See Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 621 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring). 
206 My initial instincts with respect to the children of tourists is that, even assuming 
such children are not the appropriate subjects of prescriptive citizenship rules and are 
unlikely to independently become substantive citizens in the way anticipated by predictive 
citizenship rules, devising a rule that excludes them while including others who are indeed 
likely to become substantive citizens or who ought to be nudged toward substantive 
citizenship comes at too great an administrative cost. Matthew Lister, however, is open to a 
potential citizenship rule that excludes the children of tourists:  
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citizenship fails to carry out any of the potential roles it could play with respect to 
the substantive citizenship of U.S.-born children of tourists, that has no bearing on 
whether formal citizenship fulfills an important role with respect to the substantive 
citizenship of the U.S.-born children of undocumented immigrants.  
I do not undertake a full analysis of the question of whether birthright 
citizenship for the children of undocumented immigrants accurately and adequately 
predicts or prescribes substantive citizenship—my purpose is merely to show how 
the framework proposed in this Article helps illuminate current citizenship and 
immigration debates—but I suggest that the children of undocumented immigrants 
are precisely the individuals that ought to be nudged toward substantive citizenship. 
These children are likely to remain in the United States. It would be a tragedy to 
create an underclass of sub-citizens, possibly stateless individuals, who walk on an 
unprotected, parallel path toward substantive citizenship or wander aimlessly on the 
citizenship map without access to the formal citizenship path.207 
                                                      
The version of the jus soli principle that I argue is required by liberal 
principles of justice, at least in any world in which we are likely to achieve in the 
near future, requires that citizenship be granted to anyone born in a state who 
spends any significant amount of time in the state—who “avails” himself of the 
good provided by the state—before the age of maturity. This applies, with only a 
few special exceptions, to anyone born in a particular state regardless of the legal 
status of his parents. This approach would be weaker, however, than the current 
U.S. rule because someone merely born in a state, who leaves at a very young age 
and who is entitled to citizenship in another country (to prevent statelessness), 
does not “avail” himself of the benefits of the society of his birth and therefore is 
not entitled to citizenship. 
 
Lister, supra note 82, at 207. 
207 Not only does the conferral of birthright citizenship on the U.S.-born children of 
undocumented immigrants foster those individuals’ development of substantive citizenship, 
it helps integrate families and communities. As Hiroshi Motomura has described, 
  
[Birthright citizenship] is part of the integration of immigrants into 
American society. Children in immigrant families are typically much more likely 
than their parents to become integrated linguistically, socially, and in other 
dimensions. This is true regardless of a child’s legal status, but is even more true 
for children who have lawful immigration status or citizenship, which allows them 
to serve more effectively as cultural brokers between their parents and mainstream 
society outside immigrant enclaves. Their brokering role often starts with 
translating between their parents and teachers, not only from English but also from 
the culture of the school system and American society generally. In this way, a 
significant implication of both birthright citizenship and the DREAM act is 
allowing children to help not just themselves integrate, but their families, too.  
 
Motomura, supra note 198, at 1136-37; see also MOTOMURA, supra note 180, at 180–81 
(“By conferring lawful status on some family members, both birthright citizenship and the 
DREAM Act foster the integration of all family members, including those without lawful 
immigration status.”). 
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B.  The DREAM Act and a “Path to Citizenship” 
 
While the U.S.-born children of undocumented immigrants have access to the 
formal citizenship path under current U.S. law, individuals who were born without 
U.S. citizenship but grow up in the United States as undocumented immigrants find 
themselves in a more politically fraught controversy. The ultimately failed 
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2010208 (“the DREAM 
Act” or “the Act”) sought to provide undocumented immigrants who arrived in the 
United States as children (“DREAMers”) a path to citizenship in the United 
States.209 The Act provided a three-step system that ultimately led to naturalization 
for eligible noncitizens.210 Noncitizens under the age of thirty-five who had arrived 
in the United States before age sixteen and had graduated from a U.S. high school 
were eligible for a temporary conditional status if they were accepted into a U.S. 
institution of higher education.211 They later could adjust their status to that of lawful 
permanent residents after ten years and after completing two years in a bachelor’s 
degree program or serving two years in the Armed Forces.212 Finally, after three 
years as legal permanent residents, DREAMers would be eligible to naturalize.213 
The DREAM Act, in effect, provided beneficiaries with a formal status and an 
avenue for obtaining citizenship. The Act, in my analogy, would place beneficiaries 
on an entrance onramp for the highway. The result for DREAMers would be 
significant. They would enjoy many opportunities that were inaccessible to them as 
undocumented immigrants. Legal status would open doors to education,214 
employment,215 travel outside of the United States without fear of being unable to 
                                                      
208 S. 3992, 111th Cong. (2010). 
209 Id. § 4; see Elisha Barron, Recent Development: The Development, Relief, and 
Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 623, 623, 626-31 (2011); 
Mariela Olivares, Renewing the Dream: DREAM Act Redux and Immigration Reform, 16 
HARV. LATINO L. REV. 79, 85-90 (2013).  
210 See Barron, supra note 209, at 626-30 (conceptually dividing the DREAM Act, S. 
3992 §§ 5, 6, as follows: the first step is conditional nonimmigrant status (§ 5); the second is 
permanent residence (§ 6); and the third is naturalization (§ 6(k))). 
211 S. 3992 § 4(a)(1)(A)–(F); Barron, supra note 209, at 627. 
212 S. 3992 § 6(a), (c)–(d)(1)(D); Barron, supra note 209, at 629. 
213 S. 3992 § 6(k); Barron, supra note 209, at 631. 
214 For discussions of the challenges that undocumented immigrants face in access to 
education and related legal developments, see Michael A. Olivas, IIRIRA, The Dream Act, 
and Undocumented College Student Residency, 30 J.C. & U.L. 435, 437–52 (2004); Olivas, 
supra note 69, at 108–14; Michael A. Olivas, The Political Economy of the DREAM Act and 
the Legislative Process: A Case Study of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 55 WAYNE 
L. REV. 1757, 1759–69 (2009) [hereinafter Olivas, The Political Economy].  
215 Besides allowing formal access to work opportunities, work authorization also 
removes the fear that many undocumented workers have in enforcing employment rights. 
See Núñez, supra note 26, at 869–71 (discussing the difficulty of fully enforcing many 
employment and workplace rights as an undocumented worker); Michael A. Olivas, Dreams 
Deferred: Deferred Action, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Vexing Case(s) of DREAM Act 
Students, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 463, 540–47 (2012). 
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return, and more. Once they became citizens, they would have the right to vote and 
participate in the political process. 
Though the DREAM Act would not have immediately conferred citizenship on 
its recipients, the framework proposed in this Article is a useful tool for 
understanding the discussion surrounding the Act because public rhetoric addressed 
the DREAM Act in terms of a “path to citizenship.”216 In fact, the public rhetoric 
surrounding the DREAM Act in many ways mirrored the public rhetoric related to 
territorial birthright citizenship. 
Proponents of the DREAM Act largely framed the issue as an economic one 
and a moral one. Allowing U.S.-educated children to go to college and work would 
stimulate the economy, many argued.217 Some also championed the Act as the “right 
thing to do.”218 It would be unfair, proponents argued, to punish individuals who 
made no choice to immigrate to the United States without authorization.219 
Opponents were reluctant to support the Act because, among other things, they 
believed it incentivized unauthorized immigration, insufficiently disincentivized 
fraud, allowed beneficiaries to petition for immigration benefits for their 
undocumented immigrant relatives, and extended eligibility to too many.220 The 
DREAM Act failed by a narrow margin of votes, disappointing many on both sides 
of the political spectrum.221 
                                                      
230 See, e.g., Editorial, A Path to College, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/17/opinion/la-ed-tuition-20101117 [https://perma.cc/ 
BV67-6RSD]. 
217 Id. (“Economically, it makes sense to encourage these students to go to college; if 
they become successful professionals, business owners and taxpayers in California, they will 
contribute to the state’s coffers.”). For an analysis of the advocacy used during the height of 
debates about the DREAM Act, see Olivares, supra note 209, at 97–98 (“Rather than 
continue to engage in the same debates about the righteousness of helping the DREAMers, 
advocates and legislators must change course and highlight the potential gains to the country 
(not just the DREAMers) in passing the DREAM Act.” (citation omitted)). 
218 See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, supra note 199 (“[S]end me the 
DREAM Act . . . and I will sign it right away. . . . I will not give up on this issue, not only 
because it’s the right thing to do for our economy[,] . . . not just because it’s the right thing 
to do for our security, but because it’s the right thing to do, period.”); see also Editorial, 
supra note 217 (“Morally, it also makes sense; it would be unfair to penalize children who 
arrived in this country as minors and had no choice in the decision to come, and who 
themselves committed no crime.”); Editorial, Dream Time, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2010) (on 
file with the Utah Law Review), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/20/opinion/20mon2.html 
(“Those who might qualify . . . are blameless for their illegal status and helpless to make it 
right.”). 
219 Editorial, supra note 217. 
220 See Barron, supra note 209, at 623–25 (analyzing the arguments of proponents and 
opponents to the DREAM Act and categorizing the types of arguments used on both sides). 
221 For a comprehensive history of the genesis of the DREAM Act and the bipartisan 
support it initially had, see Olivas, The Political Economy, supra note 214, at 1759–1802. 
The Act’s bipartisan support may be attributed, in part, to its relatively narrow focus. That 
is, while comprehensive immigration reform would likely provide many issues over which 
individuals could disagree, the relatively narrow DREAM Act excluded many such issues. 
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But this had not been the first and was not the last attempt to address the status 
of undocumented immigrants in the United States. Prior proposals and subsequent 
efforts to resurrect the DREAM Act failed without much fanfare. But it is the 
alternative versions proposed by opponents of the 2010 DREAM Act that highlight 
the core of the disagreement between supporters and opponents. Senator Marco 
Rubio, for example, proposed a diluted version of the Act in which eligible 
noncitizens would obtain legal status in the United States but would be ineligible for 
citizenship.222 “You can legalize someone’s status,” he said, “without placing them 
on a path toward citizenship.”223 Mitt Romney, on the other hand, favored granting 
a form of residency to undocumented immigrants in exchange for military service: 
“I’m delighted with the idea that people who come to this country and wish to serve 
in the military can be given a path to become permanent residents of this 
country . . . .”224  
The alternative proposals suggest that the true opposition to the DREAM Act 
was based on an understanding of formal citizenship as a purely descriptive status. 
In proposing alternatives that did not lead to citizenship at all and that imposed more 
specific criteria for access to formal citizenship, opponents essentially disagreed 
with proponents of the original DREAM Act about whether its would-be 
beneficiaries had sufficiently developed substantive citizenship. In other words, 
many commentators treated the DREAM Act’s provision for access to formal 
citizenship as a descriptive citizenship rule. Disagreements centered around the 
question of how much substantive citizenship warranted access to formal 
citizenship. Did the DREAMers have enough substantive citizenship to ultimately 
become citizens? How should DREAMers prove their substantive citizenship? 
Military service? High school graduation? College education? 
Imagining the DREAM Act as a process that ends in formal citizenship once 
those individuals have proven their substantive citizenship is certainly one valuable 
way to explore the issue. It is easy to visualize the DREAMers as individuals who 
are on paths parallel to the formal citizenship path, approaching substantive 
citizenship, but unprotected by the rights and benefits that the formal citizenship 
path provides. They grow up in the United States, attend school in the United States, 
enroll in college, and likely develop all of the same qualities of substantive 
citizenship that their documented and citizen counterparts do. And DREAMers do 
                                                      
See id. at 1789–1802 (arguing that the DREAM Act would be a perfect test case for 
determining to what extent piecemeal immigration legislation could be more successful than 
a comprehensive immigration solution). 
222 Editorial, A Dream Act Without the Dream, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2012) (on file 
with the Utah Law Review), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/opinion/a-dream-act-
without-the-dream.html. 
223 Id. For other legislation proposing a path to legal status without a route to citizenship 
for DREAMers, see STARS Act, H.R. 5869, 112th Cong. (2012). 
224 James Oliphant, Mitt Romney Says He Would Veto DREAM Act, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 
1, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/01/health/la-pn-mitt-romney-says-he-would-
veto-dream-act-20120101 [https://perma.cc/62JQ-RNVS]. 
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this in spite of the obstacles that their undocumented status poses. In some sense, 
their development of substantive citizenship merits the grant of formal citizenship. 
But these arguments are incomplete. Formal citizenship can be more than 
descriptive of an individual’s substantive citizenship. Formal citizenship can also be 
predictive and prescriptive. Instead of discussing formal citizenship as a final 
destination that lies at the end of a “path to citizenship,” commentators must also 
discuss the citizenship path itself. What might formal citizenship do to foster 
substantive citizenship in DREAMers? How much faster might DREAMers develop 
substantive citizenship as formal citizens rather than blazing a difficult trail? Formal 
citizenship may be much more than a reward for the DREAMers’ development of 
substantive citizenship; formal citizenship may also be a driving force in their 
development of substantive citizenship. With formal citizenship, DREAMers would 
be included in significant opportunities for substantive citizenship building. For 
example, they would have increased access to educational opportunities that would, 
in turn, help them contribute to their communities. DREAM Act beneficiaries might 
develop increased loyalty to a country that affirmatively claims them as the 
country’s own. Beneficiaries might find the prospect of political participation an 
incentive for increased engagement in political debate. Again, the purpose of this 
Article is not to answer the question of whether and to what extent formal citizenship 
might foster substantive citizenship in DREAM Act beneficiaries, but rather to offer 
a framework for recasting and renewing important debates that touch on 
immigration and citizenship issues. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
Formal citizenship and substantive citizenship are related but not synonymous. 
Though all formal citizenship rules place individuals on what I have described as 
the citizenship trajectory, they do so in different ways and at different points on the 
trajectory toward substantive citizenship. This view of citizenship helps explain the 
coexistence of multiple, varying citizenship rules leading to equal citizenship and 
reveals the often overlooked prescriptive role of citizenship. Moreover, it provides 
a framework and language for future discussions of formal citizenship’s relationship 
to substantive citizenship. Analyzing citizenship rules under this framework reveals 
dynamics that are worth exploring.  
Here, I have translated the debates surrounding territorial birthright citizenship 
for the U.S-born children of undocumented immigrants and the DREAM Act into 
the language of my framework. This helps illuminate the perceived role that formal 
citizenship plays for commentators on both sides of these issues and highlights the 
failure of many commentators to account for the other roles that formal citizenship 
plays. In addition to discussing a path to citizenship, we must discuss the citizenship 
path itself. That is, rather than treating formal citizenship as a reward for developing 
a more substantive sense of membership and belonging, or substantive citizenship, 
we must recognize formal citizenship as a mechanism for fostering that very 
substantive citizenship. But the framework proposed in this Article has value in 
many other debates and arenas of inquiry. How might proposals to reinstate felon-
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voting rights, for example, fit into this framework? Do the rights of citizen children 
adequately protect and facilitate their development of substantive citizenship? How 
did the distribution of citizenship to American Indians in the United States fit into 
this framework? Ultimately, recognition of the multidimensional relationship 
between formal citizenship and substantive citizenship facilitates clearer and more 
productive discussion of citizenship.  
